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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-
3(2)(j) (2001) ("The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: . . . (j) cases transferred to the Court of 
Appeals from the Supreme Court.").1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW2 
Did the district court correctly grant Salt Lake City Corporation's (City) 
Motion to Dismiss based on Plaintiff William P. Ramey's failure to exhaust his 
administrative remedies pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 10-9a-801(l) 
and Mr. Ramey's failure file a Notice of Claim in compliance with the 
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, Utah Code Annotated section 63-30d-401 
(2004), et seq.? 
Did the district court correctly deny Mr. Ramey's request for postjudgment 
relief under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60? 
1
 In the statement of jurisdiction, Mr. Ramey's brief mistakenly cites Utah Code 
Annotated section 78-2-2a(3)(2). This Code section does not exist. 
2
 Appellee Salt Lake City Corporation restates the issues presented for review 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b)(1), because the City is 
"dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant." Mr. Ramey's presentation of the 
issues includes the trial court's denial of his request for a Temporary Restraining 
Order (Ramey Brief p. 1, issue 2) and the trial court's failure to address his claims 
for injunctive relief (id., issue 3). Neither of these issues was preserved for appeal 
through designation in Mr. Ramey's notice of appeal. Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 3(d) requires that "[t]he notice of appeal shall . . . designate the 
judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from." Id. See footnote 9, infra, for 
analysis of this issue. 
1 
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss for correctness. 
"Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law, 
which this Court reviews 'under a correction of error standard, giving no particular 
deference to the trial court's determination.'" Xiao v. University of Utah, 2006 UT 
575 [^7,144 p.3d 1142; see also State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, ^10, 975 P.2d 
489. 
RELEVANT STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-701 (2005) (Appeal authority required-Condition 
precedent to judicial review—Appeal authority duties.) 
(1) Each municipality adopting a land use ordinance shall, by ordinance, establish 
one or more appeal authorities to hear and decide: 
(a) requests for variances from the terms of the land use ordinances; and 
(b) appeals from decisions applying the land use ordinances. 
(2) As a condition precedent to judicial review, each adversely affected person 
shall timely and specifically challenge a land use authority's decision, in 
accordance with local ordinance. 
(3) An appeal authority: 
(a) shall: 
(i) act in a quasi-judicial manner; and 
(ii) serve as the final arbiter of issues involving the interpretation or 
application of land use ordinances; and 
(b) may not entertain an appeal of a matter in which the appeal authority, or 
any participating member, had first acted as the land use authority. 
(4) By ordinance, a municipality may: 
(a) designate a separate appeal authority to hear requests for variances than 
the appeal authority it designates to hear appeals; 
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(b) designate one or more separate appeal authorities to hear distinct types 
of appeals of land use authority decisions; 
(c) require an adversely affected party to present to an appeal authority 
every theory of relief that it can raise in district court; 
(d) not require an adversely affected party to pursue duplicate or successive 
appeals before the same or separate appeal authorities as a condition of the 
adversely affected party's duty to exhaust administrative remedies; and 
(e) provide that specified types of land use decisions may be appealed 
directly to the district court. 
(5) If the municipality establishes or, prior to the effective date of this chapter, has 
established a multiperson board, body, or panel to act as an appeal authority, at a 
minimum the board, body, or panel shall: 
(a) notify each of its members of any meeting or hearing of the board, body, 
or panel; 
(b) provide each of its members with the same information and access to 
municipal resources as any other member; 
(c) convene only if a quorum of its members is present; and 
(d) act only upon the vote of a majority of its convened members. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(l) (2007) (No district court review until 
administrative remedies exhausted). 
No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision 
made under this chapter, or under a regulation made under authority of this 
chapter, until that person has exhausted the person's administrative 
remedies as provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority and Variances, if 
applicable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-101, et seq. (Governmental Immunity Act of Utah). 
Because of its length, section 63-30d-101 (2004) et seq. is attached in the 
Addendum at 2. 
Salt Lake City Code of Ordinances 
$ 21A.12.040(D) (Procedures). 
3 
"Any person adversely affected by an interpretation rendered by the zoning 
administrator may appeal to the board of adjustment in accordance with the 
provisions of chapter 21 A. 16 of this part." 
$ 21A.16.020 (Parties Entitled To Appeal). 
"An applicant or any other person or entity adversely affected by a decision 
administering or interpreting this title [21 A, Zoning] may appeal to the board of 
adjustment." 
$ 21A.16.040 (Appeal of Decision). 
"Any person adversely affected by any decision of the board of adjustment 
may, within thirty (30) days after the decision is made, present to the district court 
a petition specifying the grounds on which the person was adversely affected." 
§ 21A.36.020B (Conformance With Lot And Bulk Controls), 
"Central air conditioning systems, heating, ventilating, pool and filtering 
equipment, the outside elements shall be located not less than 4 feet from a lot 
line." 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, 
4 
except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made 
by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of 
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. 
A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a 
further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being 
joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive 
pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or 
objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse 
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may 
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a 
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside 
the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion 
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided 
in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present 
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Ramey3 brought this action relative to property he owned at 38 South 
1000 East in Salt Lake City, Utah, after a Certificate of Noncompliance (the 
Certificate) was placed on the property due to the improper placement of an air 
conditioning unit. The unit was placed too close to the property line, in violation 
of a City building code. 
On December 14, 2006, Mr. Ramey filed his Complaint and Request for a 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction in Third District Court. 
3
 Although Mr. Ramey is appearing pro se, he is a member of the Utah State Bar, 
number 10901 (inactive status). While courts may be "generally lenient with pro 
se litigants," Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11,1f4, 67 P.3d 1000, Mr. Ramey "is not 
in the same position as most pro se litigants in that . . . he is law trained." State v. 
Schwenke, 2007 WL 3197537, * l n . l , 2007 UT App 354 (unreported decision) 
(Addendum at 5). 
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(R. at 1-19; Addendum at 1.) After hearing the parties' oral arguments, the trial 
court denied the request for a Temporary Restraining Order in a minute entry. (R. 
at 69-71.) Subsequently, on January 11, 2007, the City filed a Motion to Dismiss 
and a Memorandum in support thereof, based on the fact that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction over the case because of Mr. Ramey's failure to exhaust his 
administrative remedies and his failure to file a Notice of Claim pursuant to Utah 
statute. (R. at 89-91.) The City argued that the lack of jurisdiction required the 
trial court to dismiss Mr. Ramey's Complaint. 
After the parties fully briefed the Motion to Dismiss, the trial court held a 
hearing on March 12, 2007. At that hearing, Mr. Ramey stated that he filed a 
Notice of Claim on January 5, 2007, which was twenty-two days after he filed the 
Complaint. (R. 238.) On March 14, 2007, the trial court granted the City's 
motion to dismiss in a minute entry. (R. 162-165.) Mr. Ramey then filed a 
Request for Relief under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60, which, after 
briefing, the trial court denied. (R. 166-68; 208-10.) On May 15, 2007, the trial 
court issued a Final Order granting the City's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), based on the court's lack of jurisdiction. (R. 211-
15.) Mr. Ramey filed a Notice of Appeal on June 14, 2007 (R. 216-19). On July 
30, 2007, a Certificate of Correction and Compliance, documenting that the zoning 
violation on the property at issue had been corrected and removing the Certificate 
6 
of Noncompliance from the property, was filed and recorded with the Salt Lake 
County Recorder's Office. (Addendum at 3.)4 
II. Statement of Undisputed Facts5 
Mr. Ramey filed his Complaint concurrently with his Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order. (R. at 1-40.) His Complaint contained ninety-
seven separately numbered paragraphs. (R. at 1-19.) He alleged his right to 
recover damages from the City based upon the following legal theories: 1) 
Tortious Interference with Contract and Prospective Contract (R. at 8, fflf 43-46); 
2) Negligent Misrepresentation (R. at 9, ffi[ 47-52) and (R. at 9-10, ffi[ 53-58); 3) 
Negligence (R. at 10, ffif 59-63); 4) Fraud (R. at 9-11, ^  64-67), Wrongful 
Recordation and Wrongful Attachment (R. at 11-12, ^ 68-72); 5) 
Conversion/Trespass to Try Title/Trespass to Real Property (R. at 12-13, ^ 73-
4
 The City acknowledges that the Certificate of Correction and Compliance was 
filed after the decision below and therefore is not in the Record. Nevertheless, this 
Court may take judicial notice of it because it is a public record and discloses that 
an issue has been mooted by actions subsequent to the proceedings below. "[A] 
reviewing court may take judicial notice of events or facts which, while not 
appearing in the record, disclose that an issue has been mooted." AmJur Evidence 
§ 44. See Argument, subsection C, infra, arguing that because the zoning 
violation has been remedied, and the Certificate of Noncompliance removed, Mr. 
Ramey's requests for injunctive relief are moot. The City will file a Motion 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 37, Suggestion of Mootness, on this 
issue. 
5
 The City does not address facts which it deems irrelevant to determination of this 
case. The City is admitting these facts for purposes of this appeal only. The City 
also notes that Mr. Ramey never cites to the record in his appellate brief. This 
violates Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(e), which requires "[references 
shall be made to the pages of the original record." Further, subsection (k) of Rule 
24 states, "briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken." 
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77); 6) Suit to Quiet Title/Trespass to Real Property (R. at 13-14, fflf 78-81); and 7) 
Slander of Title (R. at 14-15, ffij 82-86, 87-91). Based upon these legal theories, 
Mr. Ramey filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction, (R. at 15-16, ffif 92-97), including requests for damages (R. at 17), 
attorney's fees (R. at 17, ffl| E & G), costs (R. at 17, U F), and "treble damages" 
(R.atUG(2)). 
Mr. Ramey's Complaint alleged that the damages and other relief were 
based upon his claim that the City improperly filed a "Notice of Non-Compliance" 
(Certificate) related to property Mr. Ramey owned at 38 South 1000 East in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. (R. at 2, 3 If 8). The Certificate of Noncompliance at issue, 
dated November 21, 2006 (R. at 119), specifically stated that the noncompliance is 
with respect to Salt Lake City Code of Ordinances section 21 A.36.020(B). Mr. 
Ramey alleged that the City wrongfully filed the Certificate despite previously 
indicating that an air conditioning unit on Ramey's property met the City's 
requirements. (R. at 3-8, ^ 10-42). Specifically, Mr. Ramey alleged that the air 
conditioning unit on his property, which violated City Code by being too close to 
his property line, should be allowed to remain in place. (Id.) His Complaint 
alleged that he had exhausted his administrative remedies when he received 
"approval for the placement of the A/C unit when he purchased the property." (R. 
at 8, ]^ 41.) The Complaint also alleged alternatively that he was not required to 
file a Notice of Claim pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah 
8 
because the City had notice of his allegations, and that he did file a Notice of 
Claim. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Ramey's Complaint because it did 
not have subject matter jurisdiction. Under Utah Code Annotated section 10-9a-
801(1), there is no jurisdiction to hear Mr. Ramey's allegations because he failed 
to exhaust his administrative remedies. Further, Mr. Ramey's failure to file a 
Notice of Claim with the City, as is required by the Governmental Immunity Act 
of Utah, is fatal to his claim and deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30d-401 et seq. (Governmental Immunity Act of Utah). Even if 
Mr. Ramey has alleged equitable claims in addition to his claims for monetary 
damage, he is still required to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to state 
statute. See Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 2003 UT 7, fl9, 67 P.3d 466 (holding, 
under predecessor statute, administrative process cannot be avoided in favor of 
filing equitable claims directly in district court). Because of these deficiencies, the 
trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Ramey's Complaint pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b). 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court's Order in this case granting the City's Motion to Dismiss, filed 
May 15, 2007, cites Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and (1). (R. at 211-
15.) A court may consider facts alleged outside the complaint in a 12(b)(1) ruling, 
9 
but not in a 12(b)(6) ruling. In Millet v. Logan City, this Court explained the 
standard used when reviewing a rule 12(b)(6) motion: 
A trial court's decision granting a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a 
complaint... is a question of law that we review for correctness, giving no 
deference to the trial court's ruling. When reviewing for correctness, we 
accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interpret those 
facts and all inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff as the non-moving party. 
2006 UT App 466, [^5, 147 P.3d 971 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). In Wheeler v. McPherson, the Court explained that different factual 
allegations may be considered in 12(b)(1) motions: "Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
12 . . . does not convert motions based on subsections (b)(1) through (5) . . . into 
motions for summary judgment simply because they include some affirmative 
evidence relating to the basis for the motion." 2002 UT 16, ^ 20, 40 P.3d 632 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In this case, even if the trial court 
considered evidence outside of the Complaint, its grant of the Motion to Dismiss 
was still correct and should be upheld by this Court. 
A. Because Mr. Ramey Failed to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies, 
the Court below Correctly Dismissed for Lack of Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction. 
Mr. Ramey's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies required the 
trial court to dismiss his Complaint. In this case, Mr. Ramey had a right to appeal 
his dispute under Salt Lake City Code of Ordinances sections 21 A. 12.040(D) and 
21 A. 16.020. However, he does not claim in his Complaint, his Response to the 
10 
Motion to Dismiss, or on appeal that he appealed to the Board of Adjustment and 
received a result prior to filing in district court. Thus, Mr. Ramey had an 
administrative remedy regarding a land use decision that he failed to exhaust prior 
to filing suit. Mr. Ramey's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies deprived 
the trial court of jurisdiction, and it therefore correctly dismissed Mr. Ramey's 
Complaint. 
Utah law states, "No person may challenge in district court a municipality's 
land use decision made under this chapter, or under authority of this chapter, until 
that person has exhausted the person's administrative remedies." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9a-801(l). Thus, prior to filing his Complaint, Mr. Ramey was required to 
exhaust administrative remedies, by appealing the land use decision and following 
the appeal process outlined in the City's ordinance. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-
701(l)(b) ("Each municipality adopting a land use ordinance shall, by ordinance, 
establish one or more appeal authorities to hear and decide: . . . (b) appeals from 
decisions applying the land use ordinances.") Failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction, leaving it with "'only the 
authority to dismiss the action.'" Horn v. Utah Dept. of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 
99 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). 
The land use decision at issue found that the location of an air conditioning 
unit on Mr. Ramey's property did not comply with the City's zoning ordinance. 
The Certificate of Noncompliance, dated November 21, 2006 (R. at 119), 
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specifically stated that the noncompliance is with respect to Salt Lake City Code 
of Ordinances (SLCCO) section 21A.36.020(B). That land use ordinance requires 
that central air condition systems "shall be located not less than 4 feet from a lot 
line." Id, To appeal the decision that the unit does not meet this requirement, Mr. 
Ramey was required to follow the City's procedure authorized by Utah Code 
Annotated section 10-9a-801. Under City Code, "Any person adversely affected 
by an interpretation rendered by the zoning administrator may appeal to the board 
of adjustment in accordance with the provisions of chapter 21 A. 16 of this part." 
SLCCO § 21A.12.040(D). Chapter 21A.16 specifically states, "An applicant or 
any other person or entity adversely affected by a decision administering or 
interpreting this title [21 A, Zoning] may appeal to the board of adjustment."6 
SLCCO § 21A. 16.020. However, rather than appealing the land use decision as 
required by statute and ordinance, Mr. Ramey filed an action in district court. 
Mr. Ramey argues that he was not required to exhaust his administrative 
remedies, because his Complaint is about the City's policies and procedures, not 
about the Certificate of Noncompliance.7 (Ramey Brief, p. 22, 24.) However, Mr. 
Ramey's Complaint is based on the land use decision itself, and he is therefore 
required to exhaust the statutorily mandated administrative remedies before a trial 
6
 Under either City Code section 21 A.12.040(D) or section 21A.16.020 Mr. 
Ramey has an administrative remedy, to the same entity, which he did not exhaust. 
Nevertheless, in his Complaint, Mr. Ramey repeatedly cites the City's filing of a 
Certificate of Non-compliance against his property as a reason for filing his 
Complaint. (R. at 9-15 at ffi| 46, 52, 58, 63, 65-66, 69-71, 74-76, 79-86, 91, 93-97, 
and Prayer for Relief.) 
12 
court has jurisdiction to hear his case. See Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 2003 UT 7, 
Tfl|16-17, 67 P.3d 466 (interpreting predecessor statute and dismissing state law 
claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies available for municipal land 
use decisions before filing in district court). Because Mr. Ramey failed to exhaust 
his administrative remedies by appealing that decision as required by City 
ordinance, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear Mr. Ramey's Complaint and 
properly dismissed it. 
Further, if Mr. Ramey had followed the administrative appeal process 
before pursuing relief in court, the purposes behind the exhaustion requirement 
may have been met. The exhaustion requirement: 
"serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and 
promoting judicial efficiency," McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145, 
112S.Ct. 1081, 117L.Ed.2d291 (1992), by allowing an agency to correct 
its own mistakes and apply its expertise in resolving conflict and by 
creating a factual record for judicial review, respectively. 
Culbertson v. Bd. Of Co. Comm'ns of Salt Lake Co., 2001 UT 108, (^28, 44 P.3d 
642; see also Horn v. Utah Dept. of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 99 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998). By filing directly in state court, Mr. Ramey denied the City the opportunity 
to apply its expertise and correct any mistakes, if necessary. Additionally, by 
filing his action before the Board of Adjustment had the opportunity to review the 
decision, Mr. Ramey sought to avoid the administrative hearing and attempted 
instead to obtain relief directly from the court. The Utah legislature and the Salt 
Lake City Council have made quite clear, however, that the statutory process 
cannot be circumvented. 
13 
Mr. Ramey's dispute about the land use decision is appealable under Salt 
Lake City Code of Ordinances section 21A.16.020 and section 21 A. 12.040(D). 
Despite this plain language, Mr. Ramey does not claim in his Complaint, his 
Response to the Motion to Dismiss, or on appeal that he appealed to the board of 
adjustment and received a result prior to filing suit, because he cannot. Mr. 
Ramey had an administrative remedy, regarding a land use decision, which he did 
not exhaust before filing his Complaint. Mr. Ramey's failure to exhaust deprived 
the trial court of jurisdiction leaving it only with the authority to dismiss. 
Therefore, this Court should affirm the dismissal below on this ground and need 
go no further. 
B. Mr. Ramey's Claims Were Correctly Dismissed Because He Failed to 
Comply with the Requirements for Making a Claim Against a 
Governmental Entity. 
Even if the lower court could have overlooked Mr. Ramey's failure to 
exhaust his administrative remedies, his failure to file a written Notice of Claim 
against the City in compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah 
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction and invalidated the claims outlined in his 
Complaint.8 Under Utah law, 
o 
The City is also immune from suit for Mr. Ramey's claims, but because the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, this issue was not briefed. Under the 
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, governmental immunity is not waived: 
Under Subsections (3) and (4) [of the Act] if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
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Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority shall file a written Notice of Claim with the entity before 
maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise 
to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(2) (2006) (emphasis added). The claimant can file 
an action in court sixty days after filing the Notice of Claim if the governmental 
entity or employee has either denied the claim or failed to respond to the claim. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-403 (2006). 
Mr. Ramey argues that the City had notice of his claims, since he and the 
City "were in constant communication throughout 2006." (Ramey Brief 26-27.) 
Whether or not he and the City were in communication, he was still required to 
follow the Notice of Claim provisions set out in section 63-30d-401(2), above. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the UGIA generally, and the 
Notice of Claim provision in particular, "demands strict compliance with its 
requirements to allow suit against governmental entities." Wlieeler v. McPherson, 
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, 
intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference 
with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil rights; 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent 
inspection; . . . 
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or 
intentional . . . . 
The City reserved its right to assert this immunity if and when Mr. Ramey brings 
his claims in a court with jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-210 & -
301. 
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2002 UT 16, ^[13, 40 P.3d 632 (interpreting predecessor statute). The UGIA 
requires plaintiffs to "file a written Notice of Claim with the [governmental] entity 
before maintaining an action." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401(2) (2006) 
(emphasis added). 
In this case, Mr. Ramey does not allege that he filed a written Notice of 
Claim with the City in compliance with the statute. In fact, Mr. Ramey admits that 
he filed a Notice of Claim on or about January 5, 2007, twenty-two days after he 
filed the Complaint in this action. (R. at 238, In. 22 ("I filed the Notice of Claim 
on January 5, [2007]".)) Thus, Mr. Ramey failed to strictly comply with the 
UGIA. "A plaintiffs failure to comply with the UGIA's Notice of Claim 
provisions deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction." Patterson v. Am. 
Fork City, 2003 UT 7,1J10, 67 P.3d 466. Therefore, the trial court's only option 
was to dismiss the Complaint. See Wheeler, 2002 UT 16 at f^ 16 (interpreting 
predecessor statute and holding that because plaintiffs failed to strictly comply 
with Act's Notice of Claim requirement "the district court correctly dismissed 
plaintiffs' claims for lack of jurisdiction"). The touchstone is not whether the 
governmental entity knew of the issues that would be presented in the Notice of 
Claim as Mr. Ramey asserts. (Ramey Brief p. 26-27.) Rather, the touchstone is 
whether he followed the notice requirements. See Xiao v. Univ. of Utah, 2006 UT 
57, Y7, 144 P.3d 1142 (reviewing dismissal for failure to comply with statute 
under subject matter jurisdiction rubric). 
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Mr. Ramey hints in his brief on appeal that he was not required to file a 
Notice of Claim sixty days prior to filing a complaint in district court. (Ramey 
Brief p. 17.) However, Utah law is clear that an action may only be instituted in 
the district court after a Notice of Claim is either denied or the statutory period for 
the governmental entity's response has run. Utah Code Annotated section 63-3Od-
403(2)(a) provides that "a claimant may institute an action in the district court 
against the governmental entity" if the claim is denied. Municipalities have sixty 
days in which to approve or deny a claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-
403(1 )(a). At the end of the sixty day period the claim is deemed denied if the 
municipality has not approved or denied the claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-
403(1 )(b). "[P]laintiffs with claims against the state 'may institute an action in the 
district court' only after their 'claim is denied.'" Hall v. Utah Dept. ofCorr., 2001 
UT 34, T[26, 24 P.3d 958 (interpreting predecessor statute). Thus, while an action 
may be filed in district court earlier than sixty days from the Notice of Claim if the 
claim is denied earlier, an action may not be initiated prior to or 
contemporaneously with the claim being filed. In this case, Mr. Ramey filed his 
Notice of Claim after filing suit with the district court, in contravention of the 
statute. Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Ramey's Complaint for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
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C. Even if Mr. Ramey Has Alleged Equitable Claims, Those Claims Are 
Now Moot. 
Mr. Ramey also maintains that he is not required to comply with the Notice 
of Claim requirement in the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah because his 
claims are equitable. (Ramey Brief p. 25, 29-33.) In his Complaint, Mr. Ramey 
requested equitable relief in the form of the removal and/or the non-enforcement 
of the Certificate of Noncompliance. (R. at 16, prayer A-C.) Since filing his 
Complaint, the zoning ordinance violation on Mr. Ramey's property has been 
corrected, resulting in the removal of the Certificate of Noncompliance. See 
Certificate of Correction and Compliance (Addendum 2) (documenting removal of 
Certificate of Noncompliance because conditions which necessitated Certificate of 
Noncompliance have "been corrected"). Therefore, the equitable relief Mr. 
Ramey sought, through the removal and/or the non-enforcement of the Certificate 
of Noncompliance, has occurred, mooting his equitable claims.9 
9
 As stated in footnote 2, supra, Mr. Ramey included the trial court's denial of his 
request for a Temporary Restraining Order (Ramey Brief p. 1, issue 2) and the trial 
court's failure to address his claims for injunctive relief (id., issue 3) in his 
statement of the issues. Neither of these was preserved for appeal in his notice of 
appeal, pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(d) ("[t]he notice of appeal 
shall . . . designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from."). 
However, even if this Court were to liberally construe Mr. Ramey's notice of 
appeal under the "policy that where the notice of appeal sufficiently identifies the 
final judgment at issue and the opposing party is not prejudiced, the notice of 
appeal is to be liberally construed," State ex rel B.B, 2004 UT 39, ^10, 94 P.3d 
252, these issues are now moot. As documented in the Certificate of Correction 
and Compliance (Addendum 2), the Certificate of Noncompliance has been 
removed. The puipose for which Mr. Ramey sought injunctive relief was met 
when he took action to remedy the violation, and the Certificate of Noncompliance 
was removed. 
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Although the Certificate of Correction and Compliance is not in the Record, 
this Court may take judicial notice of it. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 201(f), 
judicial notice may be taken at "any stage of the proceedings," including on 
appeal. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 305 (Utah App. 1987) 
(taking judicial notice on appeal for the first time a bankruptcy discharge). In this 
case, there was no opportunity for the issue to have been raised below; Mr. Ramey 
did not correct the problem, allowing the City to remove the Certificate, until after 
Mr. Ramey filed this appeal. See Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah 
App. 1994) ("With very limited exceptions, judicial notice should not be used cto 
get around the rule precluding raising issues for the first time on appeal.'") 
(quoting Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456 
(Utah App. 1988)). Accordingly, judicial notice may be taken that the Certificate 
of Noncompliance has been removed, mooting Mr. Ramey's requests for 
injunctive relief.10 
Further, Mr. Ramey's briefing of the trial court's alleged error in "not 
addressing [his] pending requests for injunctive relief is inadequate. (Ramey 
Brief p. 35.) This section of his brief lacks any analysis or fact application in 
violation of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 
299, 304 (Utah 1998) ("It is well established that a reviewing court will not 
address arguments that are not adequately briefed."). More strikingly, the three 
cases he relies on for his proposition that the court erred by failing to address his 
pending injunctive relief (SS v. State, 972 P.2d 439 (Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter, 
970P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998); and A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. 
Aspen Const., 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999)) are not about pending injunctive 
relief. In fact, injunctive relief is not discussed in any of these cases. 
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This Court can decline to issue an opinion on a moot issue, which would be 
appropriate in this case. See State ex rel SI, 1999 UT App 390,1J40, 995 P.2d 17 
("we generally decline to render an advisory opinion on a moot issue"). ,f[A] case 
is moot where the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants." 
Jones v. Schwendiman, 721 P.2d 893, 894 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). In this case, 
the requested relief has been obtained. 
Even if this Court declines to hold that Mr. Ramey's alleged equitable 
claims are moot, the trial court still lacked jurisdiction to hear his equitable claims 
because Mr. Ramey did not file a Notice of Claim or exhaust his administrative 
remedies before filing. While true equitable claims are not governed by the Notice 
of Claims provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, a litigant is still required 
to exhaust his administrative remedies before going into court. See Patterson v. 
American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, }^12, 67 P.3d 466 (citing EIRancho Enter. Inc. v. 
Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 779 (Utah 1977)). 
In Patterson v. American Fork City, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the 
provisions of the UGIA "maybe inapplicable to some equitable claims." Id. at 
Tfl9. However, in that case the court held that the Pattersons "cite no authority for 
the proposition that the administrative process can be avoided in favor of filing 
equitable claims directly in district court. Thus, Pattersons1 remaining equitable 
claims must fail." Id. (citations omitted). Similarly, in this case, Mr. Ramey does 
not cite any relevant authority for his argument that he can avoid the 
administrative process and simply file his administrative claims in district court. 
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Moreover, Mr. Ramey's reliance on Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1154 
(Utah 1983) and El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 
780 (Utah 1977), is misplaced. Each of these cases relies on specific statutory 
provisions not at issue here. For instance, the statutory provision authorizing suit 
in El Rancho was repealed, and the claims were subsumed under the 
Governmental Immunity Act. See Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1154. The statutory 
provision at issue in Jenkins not only predated the Governmental Immunity Act, 
but it also provided a distinct basis for the claim and included its own notice 
provision. See id. Therefore, these cases are not applicable in the case before this 
Court. 
Additionally, Mr. Ramey's "equitable" claims deserve dismissal for the 
separate reason that he "has an adequate remedy at law." City of Page v. Utah 
Associated Mun. Power Syss., No. 2:05 CV 921, WL 1889882, *6 (D. Utah July 7, 
2006) (Mem. Decision) (attached at Addendum 3), (citing Buckner v. Kennard, 
2004 UT 78, K56, 99 P.3d 842). In Buckner v. Kennard, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated, "[T]he general rule is that equitable jurisdiction is precluded if the plaintiff 
has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer substantial irreparable injury. 
Equitable jurisdiction is not justifiable simply because a party's remedy at law 
failed." Id. 2004 UT 78 at ^56 (internal citation omitted). However, the trial court 
did not reach these issues, because it lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than 
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dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.11 Therefore, this Court 
should uphold the trial court's grating of the City's Motion to Dismiss, despite Mr. 
Ramey's arguments that some of his claims sounded in equity. 
D. Mr. Ramey's Postjudgment Motion to Reconsider Was Correctly 
Denied. 
Mr. Ramey argues that the trial court erred when it denied his request to 
reinstate his claims for relief under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60. 
(Ramey Brief p. 24, 36.) The trial court denied Mr. Ramey's Motion for Relief 
Under Rule 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in a Minute Entry 
dated May 9, 2007, ruling that the uMarch 14, 2007 Minute Entry accurately 
reflected the issues, facts and correct legal ruling pertaining to this case; 
furthermore, the Court's holding dismissing this action was without prejudice, 
allowing plaintiff to revisit the issues if applicable procedural requirements are 
met." (R. at 162-165.) In this ruling, the trial court reiterated its earlier decision 
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. 
When considering requests for postjudgment motions to reconsider, this 
Court has cited the Utah Supreme Court's decision that "'postjudgment motions to 
reconsider are not recognized anywhere in either the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure or the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.' [] Consequently, they will no 
1
 Although the trial court did not specifically reach these issues, it did hold that 
there was no irreparable harm to Mr. Ramey in its minute entry denying the 
request for a temporary restraining order. (R. at 69.) Accordingly, Mr. Ramey 
had an adequate remedy at law and was not suffering irreparable harm. 
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longer be recognized by this court." Radakovich v. Cornaby, 2006 UT App 454, 
1J5, 147 P.3d 1195 (citing Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, [^6, 135 P.3d 861). 
Therefore, the trial court correctly denied Mr. Ramey's request, because it was an 
impermissible postjudgment motion to reconsider, filed after the decision in Gillett 
v. Price, 2006 UT 24, T16, 135 P.3d 861. 
This Court may also refuse to consider Mr. Ramey's request to review the 
lower court's ruling denying his request for relief under rules 59 and 60 because 
he offers neither analysis of his grounds for appeal nor application of the facts on 
which he relies. Although courts may be "generally lenient with pro se litigants," 
Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, [^4, 67 P.3d 1000, pro se parties are still required 
to adequately brief issues pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24. See 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998) ("It is well established that a 
reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed.") 
More importantly, Mr. Ramey is a member of the Utah State Bar, and should be 
held to the same standards as other attorneys. See footnote 3, supra. Mr. Ramey's 
bald assertion that the trial court erred in denying his motion for relief is not 
adequately briefed, and accordingly this Court need not reach the merits of his 
claim. The trial court's judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The City respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's grant 
of the City's Motion to Dismiss. This Court can affirm the trial court's dismissal 
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on either one of two grounds. First, the trial court held that it lacked jurisdiction to 
hear Mr. Ramey's claims because Mr. Ramey had failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies. Second, the trial court held that it lacked jurisdiction 
because Mr. Ramey had failed to strictly comply with the requirements in the 
Notice of Claim provision of the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. Under 
either theory, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than dismiss 
the case.12 
This Court can also affirm the trial court's decision to deny Mr. Ramey's 
request for postjudgment relief under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60. 
Such postjudgment motions are not recognized by the Utah rules, and the request 
was properly denied. This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of the City's 
motion to dismiss. 
Dated this \ J day of November, 2007. 
MARGARET D. PLANE 
EVELYN J. FURSE 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
19 
In his conclusion, Mr. Ramey reiterates his request for attorney fees from the 
trial court action and requests attorney fees on appeal. The Utah Supreme Court 
has affirmed the rule in this jurisdiction that "pro se litigants should not recover 
attorney fees for successful litigation." Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. 
Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1374 (Utah 1996). Even if Mr. Ramey were successful, 
he would not be entitled to fees. 
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Plaintiff, 
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SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a 
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Plaintiff, William P. Ramey, III (hereinafter referred to as "Ramey"), an 
individual, files this Original Complaint and Request Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction against Defendants Salt Lake City Corporation, a corporation 
organized under the laws of the State of Utah, (hereinafter referred to as USLC Corp") 
pursuant to at least Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Parties 
1. Plaintiff William P. Ramey, III (hereinafter referred to as "Ramey"), is a 
natural person residing at 3818 Garrott Street, Houston, Texas 77006 and owning real 
property at 38 South 1000 East, Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
2. Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation (hereinafter referred to as USLC 
Corp") can be served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1) by delivering a copy of the summons and 
complaint to the recorder at City Recorder's Office, Ken Cowley, 2001 S, State St., 
#N1600 Salt Lake City, Utah 84190. A courtesy copy has also been delivered to the Salt 
Lake City Attorney's Office at 451 S. State St., Room 505, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Further, a courtesy copy has also been delivered to the Department of Community 
Development, Planning and Zoning Division, 451 S. State St., Room 505, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
Jurisdiction and Venue 
3. This is an action for tortious interference with contract and prospective 
contract, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, fraud, wrongful recordation, wrongful 
attacliment, conversion, trespass to try title, trespass to real property, slander of title, and 
for various other related claims under applicable state law. 
4. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Title 78, 
Chapter 3, Section 4 of the Utah Code. 
5. Venue is proper in this Judicial District because a substantial part of the 
events giving rise to the claim occurred in this District. Further, venue is proper in this 
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judicial District because the underlying real property at 38 South 1000 East, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84102 is located within this judicial District. 
THREE MAIN POINTS FOR PLEADINGS 
Ramey is a Bona Fide Purchaser for Value 
6. Ramey asserts that he is a bona fide purchaser for value relying on the 
permits issued by the City in the purchase of the SLC Property. All permits indicated 
that the SLC property was in compliance. All inspections were Final. No Notices of 
Non-compliance were recorded against the SLC property at the time of Ramey's closing 
on the SLC Property. 
7. Ramey's mortgage company searched the records at the time of closing 
and also did not locate any Notice of Non-compliance. 
8. The SLC Corp filed a first Notice of Non-compliance after Ramey had 
purchased and recorded his interest in the property. Ramey's purchase was partial cash 
and a mortgage. 
9. The A/C Unit was therefore a pre-existing condition. 
Ramey Acted in Reliance on SLC Corp Permits in Purchasing the SLC Property 
10. Ramey purchased the SLC Property in reliance on the SLC Corp's Final 
Inspection permits. 
11. Ramey would not have purchased the property had the permits not been 
issued as Final and Approved. 
12. The SLC Corp should not be allowed to remove validly issued Final 
Inspection Permits after Ramey has relied on them in the purchase of the property. 
Ramey Acted in Reliance on the Special Exception 
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13. After becoming aware of a Non-compliance recorded against the SLC 
property, Ramey sought t have it removed by going the extraordinary expense of both 
time and resources to prepare a Special Exception request for a previously granted Final 
Inspection Permit. 
14. The SLC Corp's Planning and Zoning Division agreed with Ramey that 
the A/C Unit was a pre-existing condition on the SLC Property at the time of Ramey 5s 
purchase and granted the Special Exception. 
15. When Ramey put his property on the market, the SLC Corp threatened to 
prevent Ramey from selling the property by recording a Notice of Non-compliance 
against the property. 
16. The SLC Corp should not be allowed to alter recorded records as it desires 
after a valid Special Exception has issued from its office. 
Background of Action 
17. On or about August 10, 2005 Plaintiff Ramey purchased certain real 
property at 38 South 1000 East, Salt Lake City, UT 84102 (hereinafter referred to as 
"SLC Property") for $575,000.00 dollars. There were no Certificates of Non-compliance 
recorded against the property. (See Affidavit of William P. Ramey, III, ^ 4.)(hereinafter 
referred to as Affidavit) 
18. The SLC Property had undergone several years of restoration including all 
electrical, plumbing and support structures. As such, there was a tremendous amount of 
contractor work service performed at the SLC Property. (Affidavit, ^ 5) 
19. Many of these contract work services performed at the SLC Property 
required special permitting and inspection procedures by the Defendant SLC Corp that 
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results in an ultimate Final Inspection report whereby the SLC Corp approves the 
contractor work services. (Affidavit, ^ 6) 
20. One such contractor work service was the placement of the Air 
Conditioning Unit, specifically a Kenmore with exterior dimensions of 27" X 33" X 14". 
The unit is a quiet, high efficiency slim-design Unit (hereinafter referred to as the A/C 
Unit). (Affidavit, 11 7) 
21. Defendant SLC Corp performed several Mechanical inspections as to the 
placement of this A/C Unit that ultimately resulted in Permit No. 199163, Final 
Inspection, dated March 4, 2005, approved by, upon information and belief, Buck, #24. 
A true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit A. (See Affidavit, ^ 8 and Exhibit 
A) 
22. This final approval was the approval by the SLC Corp of the placement of 
the A/C Unit. (Affidavit, % 8, Exhibit A) 
23. Plaintiff Ramey purchased the SLC Property in reliance upon the various 
permits issued by the SLC Corp, especially the Final Approval of permit 199163. 
(Affidavit, If 9) 
24. In or about April of 2006, Plaintiff Ramey became aware that the SLC 
Corp had filed a Certificate of Non-compliance against the SLC Property. 
25. The alleged Non-compliance was the placement of the A/C Unit within 
four (4) feet of the property line. 
26. Ramey contacted the SLC Corp's Planning and Zoning division and was 
ultimately directed to Kevin LoPiccolo, Zoning Administrator (hereinafter referred to as 
"LoPiccolo"). LoPiccolo informed Ramey that the Final Approval had been granted 
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improperly. Ramey informed LoPiccolo that he had purchased the property in reliance 
upon the permits issued by his office of the SLC Corp. Ramey informed LoPiccolo that 
he felt he was a bona fide purchaser for value. (Affidavit, ^(11) 
27. Ramey and LoPiccolo spoke several more times over the next few weeks. 
In fact, Ramey supplied the SLC Corp with copies of various final approvals that had 
been lost by the SLC Corp. (Affidavit, If 12) 
28. LoPiccolo informed Ramey that the only option for Ramey to keep the 
A/C Unit in its location was to file a Special Exception Request. (Affidavit, ^ 13), The 
Special Exception allows the SLC Corp and/or the Community to approve a building 
project. 
29. Ramey protested being required to seek approval for that which was 
already approved. The SLC Corp has a procedure in place that was followed. Ramey 
purchased the property in reliance on that procedure and the SLC Corp should not be 
changing its mind at a later date. To allow the SLC Corp to make such changes removed 
all certainty in the approval process. (Affidavit, ^ 14) 
30. However, Ramey did prepare the Special Exception request in an attempt 
to comply with the SLC Corp. The Special Exception Request is a long process whereby 
an Applicant provides a planned improvement, wit all of the specification drawings, the 
$200 fee, the cost for the mailing, and the address labels. Putting the documents together 
required about 20 hours worth of work and $204. a true and correct copy of Ramey's 
Special Exception Request is attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit. 
31. The Special Exception Request was a complete document and accepted by 
the SLC Corp for review. (Affidavit, ^ 16) 
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32. Ramey contacted LoPiccolo on numerous occasions concerning the 
Special Exception Request. (Affidavit, 1J 17) 
33. On or about June 19, 200, the SLC Corp granted the Special Exception 
request. (Affidavit, 1f 18) 
34. Ramey was told by Piccolo that the granting of the Special Exception 
Request was at least in part because the A/C Unit was a pre-existing condition at the time 
Ramey purchased the property and because of other adjacent properties to the SLC 
Property likewise had A/C Units placed in comparable proximity to the property line, 
namely the property at 42 South 1000 East. Shortly thereafter, the Special Exception was 
recorded at the County Recorder's Office. (Affidavit, If 19) 
35. Ramey then moved to Houston, Texas in August of 2006. However, 
Ramey still owns the SLC Property and has put it on the market. (Affidavit, ^ 20) 
36. On or about November 16, 2006, LoPiccolo contacted Ramey's agent and 
stated that the placement of the A/C Unit was not in compliance. In response, Ramey 
immediately contacted LoPiccolo, as they had talked before. LoPiccolo informed Ramey 
that the SLC Corp was going to issue another Non-compliant against the SLC Property 
for the placement of the A/C Unit. Ramey questioned LoPiccolo as to how that was 
possible in light of the two previous approvals and the fact that Ramey was a bona fide 
purchaser of the pre-exiting condition. LoPiccolo informed him that the SLC Corp was 
requiring the action and there was nothing he could do. (Affidavit, 1f 21) 
37. Ramey's agent questioned whether the SLC property could be sold as it is 
presently permitted. (Affidavit, |^22), 
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38. Further, LoPiccolo informed Ramey that the SLC Corp has told Ramey's 
neighbor that the SLC Property is not legally in compliance. (Affidavit, J^23) 
39. In response, Ramey has prepared and filed this document to require the 
SLC Corp to honor its two previous approvals of the placement of the A/C Unit, 
Conditions Precedent 
40. Plaintiff Ramey asserts that all conditions precedent to recovery under all 
causes of action has been met. 
41. All administrative remedies have been exhausted. Ramey had an approval 
for the placement of the A/C Unit when he purchased the property. 
42. Ramey then was required to get a Special Exception which was granted to 
him by the SLC Corp. 
COUNT I 
Tortious Interference with Contract and Prospective Contract 
43. Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 42 of this Complaint. 
44. As set forth above, Defendant SLC Corp, by and through the Planning and 
Zoning Division had granted approval of the placement of the A/C Unit through the 
normal permitting procedure under permit 199163, granted March 4, 1995. 
45. Ramey purchased the property on August 10, 1995 when there were no 
Certificates of Non-compliance recorded against the property. In August of 2006, Ramey 
relocated to Texas and placed the SLC Property on the market. In November of 2006, 
when the SLC Corp contacted Ramey's agent it committed an act of interference with 
contract in that the SLC Corp was attempting to cause the agent not to market the 
property in light of a non-existent compliance issue. 
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46. The SLC Corp's action, by and through Kevin LoPiccolo and others will 
act to dissuade purchasers, have acted to cause potential purchasers to look elsewhere, 
and has acted to prevent Ramey from selling the property. Such damage carries a dollar 




47. Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 46 of this Complaint. 
48. The SLC Corp has a duty to the property owners of Salt Lake City to 
honor its previously issued permits and Special Exceptions. 
49. At a minimum, it would be expected that the SLC Corp would honor its 
issued permits as to a bona fide purchaser or a purchaser of a pre-existing condition. 
50. The SLC Corp is not honoring its previously issued permit by threatening 
Ramey to prevent the sale of his house. 
51. The SLC Corp is not honoring its previously issued Special Exception by 
threatening Ramey to prevent the sale of his house. 
52. Ramey has been damaged by these threats and contacts at least to the 
appraised value of the property without the Certificate of Non-compliance at least to the 
appraised value of the property without the Certificate of Non-compliance. 
COUNT III 
Negligent Misrepresentation 
53. Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 53 of this Complaint. 
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54. The SLC Corp has a duty to the property owners of Salt Lake City to not 
falsely make accusations. 
55. At a minimum, it would be expected that the SLC Corp would not contact 
people to falsely state that the SLC Property is not legally in compliance. 
56. The SLC Corp has contacted Ramey's agent and stated that the SLC 
Property was not legally in compliance. 
57. The SLC Corp has contacted Ramey's neighbor and stated that the SLC 
Property is not legally in compliance. 
58. Ramey has been damaged by these false statements by the SLC Corp at 
least to the appraised value of the property without the Certificate of Non-compliance. 
All of the permits and a Special Exception have been issued by the SLC Corp. 
COUNT IV 
Negligence 
59. Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 58 of this Complaint. 
60. The SLC Corp has a duty to treat all subject properties in a particular 
zoning area the same. 
61. The standard of care would be that the rules should be enforced the same 
throughout a particular zoning area. The SLC property is in zoned R-2. 
62. The SLC Corp has not treated all property owners within Ramey's zone 
the same or similar. Ramey's neighbor, at 42 South 1000 East, has a similar A/C Unit 
that should be treated like Ramey's A/C Unit. 
63. Ramey has been damaged by this action at least to the appraised value of 




64. Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 63 of this Complaint. 
65. The SLC Corp's action of threatening to issue a Certificate of Non-
compliance and/or issuing a Certificate of Non-compliance for the previously approved 
Final Inspection of Permit 199163 and the approved Special Exception for the A/C Unit 
is being perpetuated falsely without any legal basis. Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for 
value and the A/C Unit has been approved twice. The SLC Corp is bullying Ramey by 
preventing him from transferring title of the SLC Property. 
66. Ramey will continue to be harmed by this false perpetuation and 
Defendant SLC Corp's wrongful conduct at least to the appraised value of the property 
without the Certificate of Non-compliance. 
67. As the direct and proximate result of Defendant SLC Corp's wrongful 
conduct, Defendant has unlawfully profited and Ramey has suffered and will continue to 
suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 
Count VI 
Wrongful Recordation and Wrongful Attachment 
68. Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint. 
69. The SLC Corp's action of threatening to record a Certificate of Non-
compliance and/or recording a Certificate of Non-compliance for the previously approved 
Final Inspection of Permit 199163 and the approved Special Exception for the A/C Unit 
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is being perpetuated falsely without any legal basis. Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for 
value and the A/C Unit has been approved twice. The SLC Corp is bullying Ramey. 
70. The SLC Corp's action of recording a Certificate of Non-compliance for 
the previously approved Final Inspection of Permit 199163 was perpetuated falsely 
without any legal basis. Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for value and the A/C Unit was 
approved. The SLC Corp is bullying Ramey by preventing him from transferring title of 
the SLC Property. 
71. Ramey will continue to be harmed by this false perpetuation and 
Defendant SLC Corp's wrongful conduct at least to the appraised value of the property 
without the Certificate of Non-compliance at least to the appraised value of the property 
without the Certificate of Non-compliance. 
72. As the direct and proximate result of Defendant SLC Corp's wrongful 
conduct, Defendant has unlawfully profited and Ramey has suffered and will continue to 
suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 
COUNT VII 
Conversion/Trespass to TIT Title/Trespass to Real Property 
73. Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 72 of this Complaint. 
74. The SLC Corp's action of threatening to record a Certificate of Non-
compliance and/or recording a Certificate of Non-compliance for the previously approved 
Final Inspection of Permit 199163 and the approved Special Exception for the A/C Unit 
is being perpetuated falsely without any legal basis, Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for 
value and the A/C Unit has been approved twice. The SLC Corp is bullying Ramey. 
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75. The SLC Corp's action of recording a Certificate of Non-compliance for 
the previously approved Final Inspection of Permit 199163 was perpetuated falsely 
without any legal basis. Ramey is a bona fide purchaser for value and the A/C Unit was 
approved. The SLC Corp is bullying Ramey by preventing him from transferring title of 
the SLC Property. 
76. Ramey will continue to be harmed by this false perpetuation and 
Defendant SLC Corp's wrongful conduct in that Ramey has been lost buyers in light of 
the SLC Corp's actions, including the threats and unlawful communications at least to the 
appraised value of the property without the Certificate of Non-compliance. 
77. As the direct and proximate result of Defendant SLC Corp's wrongful 
conduct, Defendant has unlawfully profited and Ramey has suffered and will continue to 
suffer irreparable harm. 
COUNT VIII 
Suit to Quiet Title/Trespass to Real Property 
78. Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 77 of this Complaint. 
79. The SLC Corp is discriminating against Ramey in the sale of his property 
by recording an improper Certificate of Non-compliance and for threatening to file an 
improper Certificate of Non-compliance. 
80. Ramey is being treated differently than even his next door neighbor who 
has a similar A/C Unit. Upon information and belief, Ramey's neighbor, at 42 South 
1000 East, has not been harassed or even contacted concerning the A/C Unit on that 
property. 
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81 Ramey is being damaged by this disparate treatment in that the SLC 
Property cannot be sold because of the thieats and actions fiom the SLC Corp 
Accoidmgly, the SLC Corp is damaging Ramey at least to the amount of his mortgage 
COUNT IX 
Slander of Title 
82 Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set 
forth mparagiaphs 1 through 81 of this Complaint 
83 Defendant SLC Corp, by and through LoPiccolo, made a false statement 
to Ramey's neighbor and leal estate agent that the property was out of compliance 
84 The SLC Corp knew that all of the permits had been approved and that a 
Special Exception had been granted 
85 The SLC Coip's actions damaged Ramey because he can now not sell the 
SLC Property 
86 The damages are at least the appiaised value of the house without the 
Certificate of Non-compliance 
COUNT X 
Slander of Title 
87 Ramey lestates and incoiporates heiein by leference the averments set 
foith mpaiagiaphs 1 through 86 of this Complaint 
88 Defendant SLC Corp, by and through LoPiccolo and, upon mfoimation 
and belief, other SLC Corp employees, has spread the woid that the SLC pioperty is not 
in compliance, a false statement 
89 The SLC Coip knew that all of the permits had been appioved and that a 
Special Exception had been gianted 
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90. The SLC Corp's actions damaged Ramey because he can now not sell the 
SLC Property. 
91. The damages are at least the appraised value of the house without the 
Certificate of Non-compliance. 
COUNT XI 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 
92. Ramey restates and incorporates herein by reference the averments set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 91 of this Complaint. 
93. Under Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a temporary 
restraining order and a preliminary injunction is warranted because: 
(1) Ramey will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or injunction issues in that 
Ramey is not able to sell the property because of the threatened and/or Recorded 
Notice of Non-compliance; 
(2) The threatened injury to Ramey outweighs the damage that the SLC Corp may 
experience, as there is quantifiable damage; 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, serves the public interest in that it restores 
certainty to various processes and prevent capricious action by SLC Corp; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that Ramey will prevail on the merits of the 
underlying claim because Ramey has a validly issued permit and a granted 
Special Exception. 
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Effect of Allowing the SLC Corp to Record a Notice of Non-compliance 
94. Allowing the SLC Corp to again record a Notice of Non-compliance 
removes all certainty from property records. 
95. Allowing the SLC Corp to again record a Notice of Non-compliance 
removes all certainty from the special exception procedure. 
96. Allowing the SLC Corp to again record a Notice of Non-compliance 
removes all certainty from the inspection process. 
97. Public policy dictates that the SLC Corp be estopped from recording 
and/or enforcing another Notice of Non-compliance against the SLC Property. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Ramey demands a judgment in his favor and demands the 
following relief: 
A. An Order temporarily Restraining the SLC Corp from recording and/or 
enforcing a Notice of Non-compliance against the SLC Property for placement of the 
A/C Unit on the North side of the property where it has been previously been approved 
through the permit procedure under permit 199163 and through the Special Exception 
Procedure, 
B. An Order prohibiting and permanently enjoining Defendant SLC Corp 
from recording, enforcing, or tlireatening to record a Notice of Non-compliance against 
the SLC Property for placement of the A/C Unit on the North side of the property where 
it has been previously been approved through the permit procedure under permit 199163 
and through the Special Exception Procedure. 
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C. A decree ordering Defendant to SLC Corp to file a Notice of Compliance 
specifically stating that tho A/C Unit is property placed to prevent further abuse of 
process by the SLC Corp. 
D. Or, in the alternative, an Order directing the SLC Corp to pay for the 
moving the A/C Unit to a platform on the roof in a location agreed to by Ramey; 
E. An award of a reasonable attorney's fee for Ramey. 
F. An award of reasonable costs for Ramey, including travel costs and court 
costs. 
G. Judgment against Defendant SLC Corp specifically including but not 
limited to th? following, to the extent allowed by law: (1) actual monetary damages 
sustained byjRamey, in the amount of at least $575,000.00 and the cash value of all 
mortgage payments from the time of the first filed Notice of Non-compliance; (2) treble 
damages kin light of the egregious conduct of the SLC Corp; (3) costs and prejudgment 
interest; and!(4) attorneys' fees. 
H. Such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate and just under 
the circumstances. 
Dated: December l_ /__, 2006 Respectfully submitted, ._ . ^ 
William P". kame^jn-
^8.SouthJj0&rEasT-
Salt Lake"City, Utah 84102 
3818GarrottSt, 
Houston, Texas 77006 
(713) 857-6005 (phone) 




63-30d-101. Title, scope, and intent. 
(1) This chapter is known as the "Governmental Immunity Act of Utah." 
(2) (a) The waivers and retentions of immunity found in this chapter apply to all functions of 
government, no matter how labeled. 
(b) This single, comprehensive chapter governs all claims against governmental entities or against 
their employees or agents arising out of the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority. 
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session 
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63-30d-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any asserted demand for or cause of action for money or damages, whether arising 
under the common law, under state constitutional provisions, or under state statutes, against a 
governmental entity or against an employee in the employee's personal capacity. 
(2) (a) "Employee" includes: 
(i) a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, or commissioners; 
(ii) members of a governing body; 
(iii) members of a government entity board; 
(iv) members of a government entity commission; 
(v) members of an advisory body, officers, and employees of a Children's Justice Center created in 
accordance with Section 67-5b-104; 
(vi) student teachers holding a letter of authorization in accordance with Sections 53A-6-103 and 
53A-6-104; 
(vii) educational aides; 
(viii) students engaged in providing services to members of the public in the course of an approved 
medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program; 
(ix) volunteers as defined by Subsection 67-20-2(3); and 
(x) tutors. 
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection (2)(a), whether or not the 
individual holding that position receives compensation. 
(c) "Employee" does not include an independent contractor. 
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions as both are defined in this 
section. 
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means each activity, undertaking, or operation of a governmental 
entity. 
(b) "Governmental function" includes each activity, undertaking, or operation performed by a 
department, agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental entity. 
(c) "Governmental function" includes a governmental entity's failure to act. 
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a 
person may suffer to his person or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his 
agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property damage. 
(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district, community development and 
renewal agency, special improvement or taxing district, local district, special service district, an entity 
created by an interlocal agreement adopted under Title 11, Chapter 13, Interlocal Cooperation Act, or 
other governmental subdivision or public corporation. 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estate, or interest in real or personal 
property. 
(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes each office, department, division, agency, authority, 
commission, board, institution, hospital, college, university, Children's Justice Center, or other 
instrumentality of the state. 
(10) "Willful misconduct" means the intentional doing of a wrongful act, or the wrongful failure to 
act, without just cause or excuse, where the actor is aware that his conduct will 
probably result in injury. 
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63-30d-201. Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, each governmental entity and each 
employee of a governmental entity are immune from suit for any injury that results from the exercise of 
a governmental function. 
(2) Notwithstanding the waiver of immunity provisions of Section 63-30d-301, a governmental 
entity, its officers, and its employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from the 
implementation of or the failure to implement measures to: 
(a) control the causes of epidemic and communicable diseases and other conditions significantly 
affecting the public health or necessary to protect the public health as set out in Title 26A, Chapter 1, 
Local Health Departments; 
(b) investigate and control suspected bioterrorism and disease as set out in Title 26, Chapter 23b, 
Detection of Public Health Emergencies Act; and 
(c) respond to a national, state, or local emergency, a public health emergency as defined in Section 
26-23b-102, or a declaration by the President of the United States or other federal official requesting 
public health related activities. 
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session 
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63-30d-202. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability - Effect of waiver 
of immunity - Exclusive remedy - Joinder of employee - Limitations on personal liability. 
(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may be construed as an 
admission or denial of liability or responsibility by or for a governmental entity or its employees. 
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the 
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person. 
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor 
may any provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict liability or absolute liability. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely affecting any immunity from suit that a 
governmental entity or employee may otherwise assert under state or federal law. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(c), an action under this chapter against a governmental 
entity for an injury caused by an act or omission that occurs during the performance of an employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiffs exclusive remedy. 
(b) Judgment under this chapter against a governmental entity is a complete bar to any action by the 
claimant, based upon the same subject matter, against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to 
the claim. 
(c) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any civil action or proceeding based upon the same subject 
matter against the employee or the estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, 
unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or willful misconduct; 
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the employee driving a vehicle, or being in actual physical 
control of a vehicle: 
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or greater by weight than the established legal limit; 
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable of 
safely driving the vehicle; or 
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that rendered the person 
incapable of safely driving the vehicle; 
(iii) injury or damage resulted from the employee being physically or mentally impaired so as to be 
unable to reasonably perform his or her job function because of: 
(A) the use of alcohol; 
(B) the nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-4; or 
(C) the combined influence of alcohol and a nonprescribed controlled substance as defined by 
Section 58-37-4; or 
(iv) in a judicial or administrative proceeding, the employee intentionally or knowingly gave, upon a 
lawful oath or in any form allowed by law as a substitute for an oath, false testimony material to the 
issue or matter of inquiry under this section. 
(4) Except as permitted in Subsection (3)(c), no employee may be joined or held personally liable for 
acts or omissions occurring: 
(a) during the performance of the employee's duties; 
(b) within the scope of employment; or 
(c) under color of authority. 
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63-30d-203. Exemptions for certain takings actions. 
An action that involves takings law, as defined in Section 63-90-2, is not subject to the requirements 
of Sections 63-30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-403, and 63-30d-601. 
Amended by Chapter 306, 2007 General Session 
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63-30d-301. Waivers of immunity — Exceptions. 
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any contractual obligation. 
(b) Actions arising out of contractual rights or obligations are not subject to the requirements of 
Sections 63-30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d-4035 or 63-30d-601. 
(c) The Division of Water Resources is not liable for failure to deliver water from a reservoir or 
associated facility authorized by Title 73, Chapter 26, Bear River Development Act, if the failure to 
deliver the contractual amount of water is due to drought, other natural condition, or safety condition 
that causes a deficiency in the amount of available water. 
(2) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived: 
(a) as to any action brought to recover, obtain possession of, or quiet title to real or personal property; 
(b) as to any action brought to foreclose mortgages or other liens on real or personal property, to 
determine any adverse claim on real or personal property, or to obtain an adjudication about any 
mortgage or other lien that the governmental entity may have or claim on real or personal property; 
(c) as to any action based on the negligent destruction, damage, or loss of goods, merchandise, or 
other property while it is in the possession of any governmental entity or employee, if the property was 
seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of state law; 
(d) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(l), as to any action brought under the authority of Article I, 
Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity 
when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses without just 
compensation; 
(e) subject to Subsection 63-30d-302(2), as to any action brought to recover attorney fees under 
Sections 63-2-405 and 63-2-802; 
(f) for actual damages under Title 67, Chapter 21, Utah Protection of Public Employees Act; or 
(g) as to any action brought to obtain relief from a land use regulation that imposes a substantial 
burden on the free exercise of religion under Title 63, Chapter 90b, Utah Religious Land Use Act. 
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), immunity from suit of each governmental entity is 
waived as to any injury caused by: 
(i) a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or 
(ii) any defective or dangerous condition of a public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other 
public improvement. 
(b) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from: 
(i) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, 
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on them; or 
(ii) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, 
or other public improvement. 
(4) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any injury proximately caused by 
a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of 
employment. 
(5) Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not waived under Subsections (3) and (4) if the 
injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: 
(a) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, a discretionary function, 
whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(b) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse 
of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or 
violation of civil rights; 
(c) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, 
suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(d) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or negligent inspection; 
(e) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or 
without probable cause; 
(f) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional; 
(g) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; 
(h) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(i) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(j) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal 
confinement; 
(k) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands; 
(1) any condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation; 
(m) any activity authorized by the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the 
Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands; 
(n) the operation or existence of a pedestrian or equestrian trail that is along a ditch, canal, stream, or 
river, regardless of ownership or operation of the ditch, canal, stream, or river, if: 
(i) the trail is designated under a general plan adopted by a municipality under Section 10-9a-401 or 
by a county under Section 17-27a-401; 
(ii) the trail right-of-way or the right-of-way where the trail is located is open to public use as 
evidenced by a written agreement between the owner or operator of the trail right-of-way, or of the 
right-of-way where the trail is located, and the municipality or county where the trail is located; and 
(iii) the written agreement: 
(A) contains a plan for operation and maintenance of the trail; and 
(B) provides that an owner or operator of the trail right-of-way or of the right-of-way where the trail 
is located has, at minimum, the same level of immunity from suit as the governmental entity in 
connection with or resulting from the use of the trail. 
(o) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for the clearing of fog; 
(p) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters; 
(q) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems; 
(r) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in accordance with the requirements of 
Section 41-6a-208; 
(s) the activities of: 
(i) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(ii) fighting fire; 
(iii) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes; 
(iv) emergency evacuations; 
(v) transporting or removing injured persons to a place where emergency medical assistance can be 
rendered or where the person can be transported by a licensed ambulance service; or 
(vi) intervening during dam emergencies; 
(t) the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or perform, any function pursuant to Title 
73, Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources - Division of Water Resources; or 
(u) unauthorized access to government records, data, or electronic information systems by any person 
or entity. 
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63-30d-302. Specific remedies — "Takings" actions — Government Records Access and 
Management Actions. 
(1) In any action brought under the authority of Article I, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution for the 
recovery of compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or 
damaged private property for public uses without just compensation, compensation and damages shall 
be assessed according to the requirements of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain. 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding Section 63-30d-401, a notice of claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection 
63-30d-301(2)(e) may be filed contemporaneously with a petition for review under Section 63-2-404. 
(b) The provisions of Subsection 63-30d-403(l), relating to the governmental entity's response to a 
claim, and the provisions of 63-30d-601, requiring an undertaking, do not apply to a notice of claim for 
attorneys' fees filed contemporaneously with a petition for review under Section 63-2-404. 
(c) Any other claim under this chapter that is related to a claim for attorneys' fees under Subsection 
63-30d-301(2)(e) may be brought contemporaneously with the claim for attorneys' fees or in a 
subsequent action. 
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session 
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63-30d-401. Claim for injury — Notice -- Contents - Service - Legal disability - Appointment 
of guardian ad litem. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), a claim arises when the statute of limitations that 
would apply if the claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(b) The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claimant knew, or with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have known: 
(i) that the claimant had a claim against the governmental entity or its employee; and 
(ii) the identity of the governmental entity or the name of the employee. 
(c) The burden to prove the exercise of reasonable diligence is upon the claimant. 
(2) Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known; and 
(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a governmental employee individually as provided in 
Subsection 63-30d-202(3)(c), the name of the employee. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; 
and 
(ii) directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to the requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 to 
the office of: 
(A) the city or town clerk, when the claim is against an incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the claim is against a school 
district or board of education; 
(D) the presiding officer or secretary/clerk of the board, when the claim is against a local district or 
special service district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of Utah; 
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or executive secretary, when the claim 
is against any other public board, commission, or body; or 
(G) the agent authorized by a governmental entity to receive the notice of claim by the governmental 
entity under Subsection (5)(e). 
(4) (a) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim against a governmental entity 
is sustained by a claimant who is under the age of majority or mentally incompetent, that governmental 
entity may file a request with the court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the potential 
claimant. 
(b) If a guardian ad litem is appointed, the time for filing a claim under Section 63-30d-402 begins 
when the order appointing the guardian is issued. 
(5) (a) Each governmental entity subject to suit under this chapter shall file a statement with the 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code within the Department of Commerce containing: 
(i) the name and address of the governmental entity; 
(ii) the office or agent designated to receive a notice of claim; and 
(iii) the address at which it is to be directed and delivered. 
(b) Each governmental entity shall update its statement as necessary to ensure that the information is 
accurate. 
(c) The Division of Coiporations and Commercial Code shall develop a form for governmental 
entities to complete that provides the information required by Subsection (5)(a). 
(d) (i) Newly incorporated municipalities shall file the statement required by Subsection (5)(a) at the 
time that the statement of incorporation and boundaries is filed with the lieutenant governor under 
Section 10-1-106. 
(ii) Newly incorporated local districts shall file the statement required by Subsection (5)(a) at the 
time that the written notice is filed with the lieutenant governor under Section 17B-1-215. 
(e) A governmental entity may, in its statement, identify an agent authorized by the entity to accept 
notices of claim on its behalf. 
(6) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall: 
(a) maintain an index of the statements required by this section arranged both alphabetically by entity 
and by county of operation; and 
(b) make the indices available to the public both electronically and via hard copy. 
(7) A governmental entity may not challenge the validity of a notice of claim on the grounds that it 
was not directed and delivered to the proper office or agent if the error is caused by the governmental 
entity's failure to file or update the statement required by Subsection (5). 
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63-30d-402. Time for filing notice of claim. 
A claim against a governmental entity, or against an employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the person and according to the requirements of 
Section 63-30d-401 within one year after the claim arises regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
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63-30d-403. Notice of claim - Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier 
within 60 days - Remedies for denial of claim. 
(1) (a) Within 60 days of the filing of a notice of claim, the governmental entity or its insurance 
carrier shall inform the claimant in writing that the claim has either been approved or denied. 
(b) A claim is considered to be denied if, at the end of the 60-day period, the governmental entity or 
its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim. 
(2) (a) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district court against the 
governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
(b) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the claim or within one year 
after the denial period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
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63-30d-501. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions. 
(1) The district courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction over any action brought under this chapter. 
(2) An action brought under this chapter may not be tried as a small claims action. 
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63-30d-502. Venue of actions. 
(1) Actions against the state may be brought in the county in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake 
County. 
(2) (a) Actions against a county may be brought in the county in which the claim arose, or in the 
defendant county, or, upon leave granted by a district court judge of the defendant county, in any county 
contiguous to the defendant county. 
(b) Leave may be granted ex parte. 
(3) Actions against all other political subdivisions, including cities and towns, shall be brought in the 
county in which the political subdivision is located or in the county in which the claim arose. 
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63-30d-601. Actions governed by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure — Undertaking required. 
(1) An action brought under this chapter shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to 
the extent that they are consistent with this chapter. 
(2) At the time the action is filed, the plaintiff shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court 
that is: 
(a) not less than $300; and 
(b) conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs incurred by the governmental entity in 
the action if the plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails to recover judgment. 
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63-30d-602. Compromise and settlement of claims. 
(1) A political subdivision, after conferring with its legal officer or other legal counsel if it does not 
have a legal officer, may compromise and settle any action as to the damages or other relief sought. 
(2) The risk manager in the Department of Administrative Services may compromise and settle any 
action against the state for which the Risk Management Fund may be liable: 
(a) on the risk manager's own authority, if the amount of the settlement is $25,000 or less; 
(b) with the concurrence of the attorney general or the attorney general's representative and the 
executive director of the Department of Administrative Services if the amount of the settlement is 
$25,000.01 to $100,000; or 
(c) by complying with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 38b, State Settlement 
Agreements, if the amount of the settlement is more than $100,000. 
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63-30d-603. Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited — Governmental entity exempt from 
execution, attachment, or garnishment. 
(1) (a) A judgment may not be rendered against a governmental entity for exemplary or punitive 
damages. 
(b) If a governmental entity would be required to pay the judgment under Section 63-30d-902 or 63-
30d-903, the governmental entity shall pay any judgment or portion of any judgment entered against its 
employee in the employee's personal capacity even if the judgment is for or includes exemplary or 
punitive damages. 
(2) Execution, attachment, or garnishment may not issue against a governmental entity. 
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63-30(1-604. Limitation of judgments against governmental entity or employee — Process for 
adjustment of limits. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2) and subject to Subsection (3), if a judgment for damages 
for personal injury against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a 
duty to indemnify, exceeds $583,900 for one person in any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the 
judgment to that amount. 
(b) A court may not award judgment of more than the amount in effect under Subsection (l)(a) for 
injury or death to one person regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the injury is 
characterized as governmental. 
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (2) and subject to Subsection (3), if a judgment for property 
damage against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to 
indemnify, exceeds $233,600 in any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the judgment to that amount, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental. 
(d) Subject to Subsection (3), there is a $2,000,000 limit to the aggregate amount of individual 
awards that may be awarded in relation to a single occurrence. 
(2) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages awarded as compensation 
when a governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public use without just 
compensation. 
(3) The limitations of judgments established in Subsection (1) shall be adjusted according to the 
methodology set forth in Subsection (4). 
(4) (a) Each even-numbered year, the risk manager shall: 
(i) calculate the consumer price index as provided in Sections 1(f)(4) and 1(f)(5), Internal Revenue 
Code; 
(ii) calculate the increase or decrease in the limitation of judgment amounts established in this section 
as a percentage equal to the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index since the previous 
adjustment made by the risk manager or the Legislature; and 
(iii) after making an increase or decrease under Subsection (4)(a)(ii), round up the limitation of 
judgment amounts established in Subsection (1) to the nearest $100. 
(b) Each even-numbered year, the risk manager shall make rules, which become effective no later 
than July 1, that establish the new limitation of judgment amounts calculated under Subsection (4)(a). 
(c) Adjustments made by the risk manager to the limitation of judgment amounts established by this 
section have prospective effect only from the date the rules establishing the new limitation of judgment 
take effect and those adjusted limitations of judgment apply only to claims for injuries or losses that 
occur after the effective date of the rules that establish those new limitations of judgment. 
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63-30d-701. Payment of claim or judgment against state — Presentment for payment. 
(1) (a) Each claim, as defined by Subsection 63-30d-102(l), that is approved by the state or any final 
judgment obtained against the state shall be presented for payment to: 
(i) the state risk manager; or 
(ii) the office, agency, institution, or other instrumentality involved, if payment by that 
instrumentality is otherwise permitted by law. 
(b) If payment of the claim is not authorized by law, the judgment or claim shall be presented to the 
board of examiners for action as provided in Section 63-6-10. 
(c) If a judgment against the state is reduced by the operation of Section 63-30d-604, the claimant 
may submit the excess claim to the board of examiners. 
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63-30d-702. Payment of claim or judgment against political subdivision — Procedure by 
governing body — Payment options. 
(1) (a) Each claim approved by a political subdivision or any final judgment obtained against a 
political subdivision shall be submitted to the governing body of the political subdivision. 
(b) The governing body shall pay the claim immediately from the general funds of the political 
subdivision unless: 
(i) the funds are appropriated to some other use or restricted by law or contract for other purposes; or 
(ii) the political subdivision opts to pay the claim or award in installments under Subsection (2). 
(2) If the subdivision is unable to pay the claim or award during the current fiscal year, it may pay the 
claim or award in not more than ten ensuing annual installments of equal size or in whatever other 
installments that are agreeable to the claimant. 
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63-30d-703. Reserve funds for payment of claims or purchase of insurance created by political 
subdivisions. 
Any political subdivision may create and maintain a reserve fund or, may jointly with one or more 
other political subdivisions, make contributions to a joint reserve fund, for the purpose of: 
(1) making payment of claims against the cooperating subdivisions when they become payable under 
this chapter; or 
(2) for the purpose of purchasing liability insurance to protect the cooperating subdivisions from any 
or all risks created by this chapter. 
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63-30d-704. Tax levy by political subdivisions for payment of claims, judgments, or insurance 
premiums. 
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a political subdivision may levy an annual 
property tax sufficient to pay: 
(a) any claim, settlement, or judgment; 
(b) the costs to defend against any claim, settlement, or judgment; or 
(c) for the establishment and maintenance of a reserve fund for the payment of claims, settlements, or 
judgments that may be reasonably anticipated. 
(2) (a) The payments authorized to pay for punitive damages or to pay the premium for authorized 
insurance is money spent for a public purpose within the meaning of this section and Article XIII, Sec. 
5, Utah Constitution, even though, as a result of the levy, the maximum levy as otherwise restricted by 
law is exceeded. 
(b) No levy under this section may exceed .0001 per dollar of taxable value of taxable property. 
(c) The revenues derived from this levy may not be used for any purpose other than those specified in 
this section. 
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63-30d-801. Insurance — Self-insurance or purchase of liability insurance by governmental 
entity authorized — Establishment of trust accounts for self-insurance. 
(1) Any governmental entity within the state may self-insure, purchase commercial insurance, or self-
insure and purchase excess commercial insurance in excess of the statutory limits of this chapter against: 
(a) any risk created or recognized by this chapter; or 
(b) any action for which a governmental entity or its employee may be held liable. 
(2) (a) In addition to any other reasonable means of self-insurance, a governmental entity may self-
insure with respect to specified classes of claims by establishing a trust account. 
(b) In creating the trust account, the governmental entity shall ensure that: 
(i) the trust account is managed by an independent private trustee; and 
(ii) the independent private trustee has authority, with respect to claims covered by the trust, to: 
(A) expend both principal and earnings of the trust account solely to pay the costs of investigation, 
discovery, and other pretrial and litigation expenses including attorneys' fees; and 
(B) pay all sums for which the governmental entity may be adjudged liable or for which a 
compromise settlement may be agreed upon. 
(c) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the trust agreement between the governmental entity and 
the trustee may authorize the trustee to: 
(i) employ counsel to defend actions against the entity and its employees; 
(ii) protect and safeguard the assets of the trust; 
(iii) provide for claims investigation and adjustment services; 
(iv) employ expert witnesses and consultants; and 
(v) provide other services and functions that are necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the 
trust. 
(d) The monies and interest earned on the trust fund may be invested by following the procedures and 
requirements of Title 51, Chapter 7, State Money Management Act, and are subject to audit by the state 
auditor. 
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63-30d-802. Insurance — Liability insurance — Government vehicles operated by employees 
outside scope of employment. 
(1) A governmental entity that owns vehicles driven by an employee of the governmental entity with 
the express or implied consent of the entity, but which, at the time liability is incurred as a result of an 
automobile accident, is not being driven and used within the course and scope of the driver's 
employment is, subject to Subsection (2), considered to provide the driver with the insurance coverage 
required by Title 41, Chapter 12a, Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act. 
(2) The liability coverages considered provided are the minimum limits under Section 31A-22-304. 
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63-30d-803. Liability insurance — Construction of policy not in compliance with act. 
(1) If any insurance policy, rider, or endorsement issued after June 30, 2004 that was purchased to 
insure against any risk that may arise as a result of the application of this chapter contains any condition 
or provision not in compliance with the requirements of this chapter, that policy, rider, or endorsement is 
not invalid, but shall be construed and applied according to the conditions and provisions that would 
have applied had the policy, rider, or endorsement been in full compliance with this chapter, provided 
that the policy is otherwise valid. 
(2) If any insurance policy, rider, or endorsement issued after June 30, 1966 and before July 1, 2004 
that was purchased to insure against any risk that may arise as a result of the application of this chapter 
contains any condition or provision not in compliance with the requirements of the chapter, that policy, 
rider, or endorsement is not invalid, but shall be construed and applied according to the conditions and 
provisions that would have applied had the policy, rider, or endorsement been in full compliance with 
this chapter, provided that the policy is otherwise valid. 
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63-30d-804. Liability insurance — Methods for purchase or renewal. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a contract or policy of insurance may be purchased or 
renewed under this chapter only upon public bid to be let to the lowest and best bidder. 
(2) The purchase or renewal of insurance by the state shall be conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of Title 63, Chapter 56, Utah Procurement Code. 
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63-30d-805. Liability insurance — Insurance for employees authorized - No right to 
indemnification or contribution from governmental agency. 
(1) (a) A governmental entity may insure any or all of its employees against liability, in whole or in 
part, for injury or damage resulting from an act or omission occurring during the performance of an 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, regardless of whether or 
not that entity is immune from suit for that act or omission. 
(b) Any expenditure for that insurance is for a public purpose. 
(c) Under any contract or policy of insurance providing coverage on behalf of a governmental entity 
or employee for any liability defined by this section, regardless of the source of funding for the 
coverage, the insurer has no right to indemnification or contribution from the governmental entity or its 
employee for any loss or liability covered by the contract or policy. 
(2) Any surety covering a governmental entity or its employee under any faithful performance surety 
bond has no right to indemnification or contribution from the governmental entity or its employee for 
any loss covered by that bond based on any act or omission for which the governmental entity would be 
obligated to defend or indemnify under the provisions of Section 63-30d-902. 
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63-30d-901. Expenses of attorney general, general counsel for state judiciary, and general 
counsel for the Legislature in representing the state, its branches, members, or employees. 
(1) (a) The Office of the Attorney General has primary responsibility to provide legal representation 
to the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of state government in cases where coverage under 
the Risk Management Fund created by Section 63A-4-201 applies. 
(b) When the attorney general has primary responsibility to provide legal representation to the 
judicial or legislative branches, the attorney general shall consult with the general counsel for the state 
judiciary and with the general counsel for the Legislature, to solicit their assistance in defending their 
respective branch, and in determining strategy and making decisions concerning the disposition of those 
claims. 
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(b), the decision for settlement of monetary claims in those cases 
lies with the attorney general and the state risk manager. 
(2) (a) If the Judicial Council, after consultation with the general counsel for the state judiciary, 
determines that the Office of the Attorney General cannot adequately defend the state judiciary, its 
members, or employees because of a conflict of interest, separation of powers concerns, or other 
political or legal differences, the Judicial Council may direct its general counsel to separately represent 
and defend it. 
(b) If the general counsel for the state judiciary undertakes independent legal representation of the 
state judiciary, its members, or employees, the general counsel shall notify the state risk manager and 
the attorney general in writing before undertaking that representation. 
(c) If the state judiciary elects to be represented by its own counsel under this section, the decision for 
settlement of claims against the state judiciary, its members, or employees, where Risk Management 
Fund coverage applies, lies with the general counsel for the state judiciary and the state risk manager. 
(3) (a) If the Legislative Management Committee, after consultation with the general counsel for the 
Legislature, determines that the Office of the Attorney General cannot adequately defend the legislative 
branch, its members, or employees because of a conflict of interest, separation of powers concerns, or 
other political or legal differences, the Legislative Management Committee may direct its general 
counsel to separately represent and defend it. 
(b) If the general counsel for the Legislature undertakes independent legal representation of the 
Legislature, its members, or employees, the general counsel shall notify the state risk manager and the 
attorney general in writing before undertaking that representation. 
(c) If the legislative branch elects to be represented by its own counsel under this section, the 
decision for settlement of claims against the legislative branch, its members, or employees, where Risk 
Management Fund coverage applies, lies with the general counsel for the Legislature and the state risk 
manager. 
(4) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 67-5-3 or any other provision of the Utah Code, the 
attorney general, the general counsel for the state judiciary, and the general counsel for the Legislature 
may bill the Department of Administrative Services for all costs and legal fees expended by their 
respective offices, including attorneys1 and secretarial salaries, in representing the state or any 
indemnified employee against any claim for which the Risk Management Fund may be liable and in 
advising state agencies and employees regarding any of those claims. 
(b) The risk manager shall draw funds from the Risk Management Fund for this purpose. 
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63-30d-902. Defending government employee - Request - Cooperation - Payment of 
judgment. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a governmental entity shall defend any action 
brought against its employee arising from an act or omission occurring: 
(a) during the performance of the employee's duties; 
(b) within the scope of the employee's employment; or 
(c) under color of authority. 
(2) (a) Before a governmental entity may defend its employee against a claim, the employee shall 
make a written request to the governmental entity to defend him: 
(i) within ten days after service of process upon him; or 
(ii) within a longer period that would not prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining a defense 
on his behalf; or 
(iii) within a period that would not conflict with notice requirements imposed on the entity in 
connection with insurance carried by the entity relating to the risk involved. 
(b) If the employee fails to make a request, or fails to reasonably cooperate in the defense, including 
the making of an offer of judgment under Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Offers of Judgment, 
the governmental entity need not defend or continue to defend the employee, nor pay any judgment, 
compromise, or settlement against the employee in respect to the claim. 
(3) The governmental entity may decline to defend, or, subject to any court rule or order, decline to 
continue to defend, an action against an employee if it determines: 
(a) that the act or omission in question did not occur: 
(i) during the performance of the employee's duties; 
(ii) within the scope of his employment; or 
(iii) under color of authority; or 
(b) that the injury or damage on which the claim was based resulted from conditions set forth in 
Subsection 63-30d-202(3)(c). 
(4) (a) Within ten days of receiving a written request to defend an employee, the governmental entity 
shall inform the employee whether or not it shall provide a defense, and, if it refuses to provide a 
defense, the basis for its refusal. 
(b) A refusal by the entity to provide a defense is not admissible for any purpose in the action in 
which the employee is a defendant. 
(5) Except as provided in Subsection (6), if a governmental entity conducts the defense of an 
employee, the governmental entity shall pay any judgment based upon the claim. 
(6) A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an employee under a reservation of rights 
under which the governmental entity reserves the right not to pay a judgment if any of the conditions set 
forth in Subsection (3) are established. 
(7) (a) Nothing in this section or Section 63-30d-903 affects the obligation of a governmental entity 
to provide insurance coverage according to the requirements of Subsection 41-12a-301(3) and Section 
63-30d-802. 
(b) When a governmental entity declines to defend, or declines to continue to defend, an action 
against its employee under any of the conditions set forth in Subsection (3), it shall still provide 
coverage up to the amount specified in Section 31A-22-304. 
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63-30d-903. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs by government employee. 
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays a judgment entered against him, or any portion of 
it, that the governmental entity is required to pay under Section 63-30d-902, the employee may recover 
from the governmental entity the amount of the payment and the reasonable costs incurred in the 
employee's defense. 
(2) (a) If a governmental entity does not conduct the defense of an employee against a claim, or 
conducts the defense under a reservation of rights as provided in Subsection 63-30d-902(6), the 
employee may recover from the governmental entity under Subsection (1) if the employee can prove 
that none of the conditions set forth in Subsection 63-30d-202(3)(c) applied. 
(b) The employee has the burden of proof that none of the conditions set forth in Subsection 63-30d-
202(3)(c) applied. 
Enacted by Chapter 267, 2004 General Session 
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TITLE WEST 
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CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTION AND COMPLIANCE 
BE IT KNOWN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
1. That I, Orion Goff, the undersigned Building Official of Building Services and Licensing, have either inspected, 
or have caused to be inspected, the property within the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, known by 
the street address of 38 South 1000 East, Salt Lake City, Utah said property being more particularly described as; 
COM XT SE COR OF LOT 8 BLK 57 PLAT B SLC SUR N 2 J4 RD W 10 RD S 2 Y2 RD E 10 RD TO BEG 5654-0465 
61B3-0772 7107-1798 7590-3001 8891-7342 9030-6260 
Owner: William P. Ramey 
2. That the conditions which caused said property to be declared a substandard building, as noted in that 
Certificate of Noncompliance and substandard conditions issued on August 8, 2005 and November 20, 2006, was 
recorded on August 17, 2005 and November 21, 2006, in book numbers 9175 and 9383, at page(s) number 1814 and 
7696, as entry numbers 9463690 and 9916056, in the official records of the County Recorder in and for the County of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah, have been corrected. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Certificate was duly signed this 
2007 
Orion Goff, B 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Inspector of Salt Lake City^ 
therein are true. 
2&. day of , 2007, personally appeared before me Orion Goff, Building Official 
^ftowledged they signed the above certificate and that the statements contained 
.QraaO 
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
D. Utah, 
Central Division. 
CITY OF PAGE, COCONINO COUNTY, 
ARIZONA, a political subdivision and municipal 
corporation of the State of Arizona, Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH ASSOCIATED MUNICIPAL POWER 
SYSTEMS ("UAMPS"), a Utah public entity and an 
interlocal cooperative agency, Defendant. 
No. 2:05 CV 921 TC. 
July 7, 2006. 
J. Scott Rhodes, Mia K. Jaksic, Jennings Strouss & 
Salmon, Phoenix, AZ, J. Michael Bailey, Vicki M. 
Baldwin, Parsons Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City, 
UT, for Plaintiff. 
Matthew F. McNulty, HI, John P. Ashton, Sam 
Meziani, Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy, 
Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
TENA CAMPBELL, District Judge. 
*1 Plaintiff City of Page, Arizona ("Page"), filed this 
lawsuit against Defendant Utah Associated Municipal 
Power Systems ("UAMPS"), an interlocal 
cooperative agency of which Page is a Member. In its 
Complaint, Page alleges nine causes of action against 
UAMPS, most of which are in relation to UAMPS's 
imposition of a "Cost Recovery Charge" on its 
Members. UAMPS filed a motion to dismiss "counts" 
three through seven, as well as count nine. The three 
causes of action that UAMPS does not challenge 
through this motion are all breach of contract claims. 
UAMPS's primary contention in support of its 
motion is that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
("UGIA") bars nearly all of Page's claims. In relation 
to various causes of action, UAMPS also argues that 
(1) Page failed to follow procedural rules applicable 
to derivative suits, (2) Page failed to plead with 
enough particularity to overcome the presumption 
that the challenged actions of the UAMPS Board of 
Directors were properly left to the business judgment 
of the board, and (3) the relevant limitations period 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
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bars Page's challenge of the legality of certain 
UAMPS meetings. 
The court grants in part and denies in part UAMPS's 
motion. Specifically, Page's claims for "Conflict of 
Interest," "Breach of Fiduciary Duty," and "Unjust 
Enrichment/Constructive Trust" are dismissed. The 
court agrees with UAMPS that the UGIA has not 
expressly waived immunity for those claims. And 
although it may be the case that Page's claim for 
unjust enrichment falls within the equitable exception 
to the immunity doctrine, Page has an adequate 
remedy at law to address the allegations underlying 
that claim. As a result, it is not appropriate to 
exercise equitable jurisdiction over that claim. 
UAMPS's motion to dismiss Page's request for 
declaratory judgments is denied, because those 
causes of action fall within the equitable exception to 
the immunity doctrine. Additionally, Page has 
sufficiently stated a claim that UAMPS violated the 
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. Accordingly, 
UAMPS's motion to dismiss that claim is denied. 
Motion to Dismiss Standard 
A court should grant a motion to dismiss when the 
complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, fails to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted. See Moore v. Guthrie. 438 F.3d 1036, 1039 
(10th Cir.2006) (all well-pleaded factual allegations 
of the complaint are accepted as true and viewed in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party), 
accord Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201 
(10th Cir.1998). While well-pleaded factual 
allegations are accepted as true, the court makes its 
own determination on legal issues. Hall v. Bellman, 
935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). "[Dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6) 'is a harsh remedy which must be 
cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of 
the liberal rules of pleading but also to protect the 
interests of justice.' " Moore. 438 F.3d at 1039 
(quoting Duran v. Cam's. 238 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th 
Cir.2001) (quotation and citation omitted)). Granting 
dismissal is only appropriate when "it appears to a 
certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under 
any state of facts which could be proved in support of 
the claim." Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. Am. Pet ro fin a. Inc., 
484 F.2d 1102, 1107 (10th Cir.1973) 
Factual Allegations 
*2 The following facts are taken from Page's 
I to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 1889882 (D.Utah) 
(Cite as: 2006 WL 1889882 (D.Utah)) 
Complaint. 
VAMPS 
UAMPS was formed under the Utah Interlocal 
Cooperation Act. (See Compl. ^ 2.) That act allows 
local governmental units "to cooperate with other 
localities on a basis of mutual advantage" in an effort 
to efficiently provide services and facilities. Utah 
Code Ann. § 11-13-102. UAMPS consists of 
approximately forty-five Members and is governed 
internally by its Amended and Restated Bylaws 
("Bylaws") and its Amended and Restated Agreement 
for Joint and Cooperative Action ("Joint Action 
Agreement"). (See id. at ^ 1f 8-9). The Bylaws 
require each Member to appoint a Member 
Representative to represent that Member's interests 
when UAMPS exercises its powers. (Id. at ^ 10.) The 
Bylaws require the UAMPS Board of Directors to act 
in the best interest of UAMPS. (Id. at If 11.) 
Each Member of UAMPS is required to sign a 
Power Pooling Agreement ("Pooling Agreement") 
and to subscribe to a power pool. (Id. at ^ 17.) But 
Members are not required to consign surplus energy 
to the power pool and, similarly, are not required to 
purchase energy from the power pool. (Id.) With the 
exception of Page's claim that UAMPS violated the 
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, the claims 
UAMPS seeks to dismiss through this motion involve 
the Pooling Agreement, (see Pool Agreement, 
attached to Compl. as Ex. C). 
The UAMPS Power Pool and Cost Recovery Charge 
Citing volatility in the energy market, the UAMPS 
Power Pool Committee directed UAMPS staff to 
acquire "forward-purchase contracts," which are 
essentially energy purchase agreements set at a 
locked rate. (See Compl. ^ 37.) The purchaser of 
such a contract is betting that the locked-in purchase 
rate will be lower than the market rate at the time the 
purchases are consummated. (See id.) 
Although UAMPS received assurances from several 
Members that they would subscribe to the forward-
purchased power, UAMPS entered into several 
purchase contacts without securing firm 
commitments that Members would subscribe to the 
power purchased. (Id. at \ 42.) UAMPS Members 
instead waited on the sidelines watching market rates 
to determine if subscribing to the power acquired by 
UAMPS would be economically beneficial. (See id. 
at \ 54.) Prevailing market conditions rendered the 
power secured by the forward-purchase contracts 
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economically unattractive and not one Member of 
UAMPS subscribed to the power UAMPS acquired 
through those contacts. (See id. at %% 65, 68.) 
As a result, UAMPS was saddled with uneconomical 
forward-purchase contacts and began to take steps to 
cover the loss. (See id. at f^ Tf 74-75.) As part of 
UAMPS's effort to offset the losses it had suffered, 
the UAMPS Board imposed a "Cost Recovery 
Charge" on all UAMPS Members. 
In its Complaint, Page raises several allegations of 
wrongdoing on the part of UAMPS in connection 
with the procurement of the forward-purchase 
contracts and the steps taken by UAMPS to cover the 
losses resulting from those contracts. Page's essential 
claim is that UAMPS impermissibly allowed active 
participants in the Power Pool to speculate on the 
energy market and to use UAMPS Members as a 
safety net to cover any losses that could result from 
that speculation. According to Page, any profit gained 
as a result of the energy-market speculation would 
benefit only Power Pool participants, but any loss 
would unfairly be allocated to all UAMPS Members, 
whether they actively participated in the Power Pool 
or not. In short, Page claims that UAMPS failed to 
place the interests of UAMPS, as an entity, above the 
individual interests of some UAMPS Members. 
Open Meetings 
*3 In its Complaint, Page also alleges that UAMPS 
violated the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. 
Page does not identify any particular meeting that 
was held in violation of the act, but claims that 
UAMPS held executive meetings without providing 
proper notice and without following any approved 
procedure to close meetings to the public. Page 
additionally alleges that UAMPS took actions against 
Page's interest at meetings held in violation of the act. 
Analysis 
Through this motion, UAMPS is seeking to dismiss 
six of Page's causes of action: Cause Three (Conflict 
of Interest), Cause Four (Breach of Fiduciary Duty), 
Cause Five (Declaratory Judgment Under Arizona 
Law), Cause Six (Declaratory Judgment Under Utah 
Law), Cause Seven (Unjust Enrichment), and Cause 
Nine (Violation of Open Meetings Law). UAMPS 
argues that Causes 3-4 (Conflict of Interest and 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty) should be dismissed 
because (1) the UGIA has not expressly waived 
immunity from the claims, (2) Page failed to follow 
procedural rules applicable to derivative actions, and 
(3) Page failed to plead with enough particularity to 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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oveicome the presumption that the challenged actions 
of the UAMPS Boaid were piopeily left to the 
boaid's business judgment UAMPS aigues that 
Causes 5-7 (the lequests foi declaiatoiy lehef and 
claim for unjust enrichment) aie also baned by the 
UGIA Finally, UAMPS contends that Cause 9 
(violation of open meetings law) is baned by the 
limitations penod set foith in the Utah Open and 
Public Meetings Act 
The couit concludes that the UGIA does not 
expiessly waive governmental immunity fiom Page's 
claims for conflict of mteiest, bieach of fiduciary 
duty, and unjust eniichment Nevertheless, Page 
aigues that even if the UGIA does not expiessly 
waive immunity fiom Page's unjust eniichment 
claim, that claim should not be dismissed because it 
falls withm the equitable exception to the immunity 
doctnne But Page's contiact claims piovide it with 
an adequate lemedy at law to addiess the factual 
allegations undeilying its unjust eniichment claim 
Accoidmgly, the couit declines to exeicise equity 
junsdiction over that claim 
Because the couit finds that theie has been no waiver 
of immunity fiom Page's claims foi bieach of 
fiducialy duty and conflict of mteiest, theie is no 
need to addiess UAMPS's aigument that those causes 
of action should be dismissed foi failuie to comply 
with pioceduial lequnements applicable to denvative 
suits Similaily, the couit's conclusion lendeis moot 
UAMPS's aigument that those causes should be 
dismissed for Page's alleged failuie to overcome the 
piesumption that the challenged actions of the 
UAMPS Boaid weie piopeily left to the boaid's 
business judgment 
The couit denies UAMPS's motion to dismiss Page's 
lequest foi declaiatoiy lehef undei both Anzona and 
Utah law Page's declaiatoiy judgment claims fall 
within the equitable exception to the immunity 
doctrine and, because Page does not have an adequate 
lemedy at law to addiess the allegations underlying 
its lequest foi declaiatoiy judgments, those claims 
may pioceed 
*4 Finally, the couit denies UAMPS's lequest to 
dismiss Page's claim that UAMPS violated Utah open 
meetings laws In outlining this cause of action, 
Page's Complaint is sufficient to satisfy the hbeial 
notice pleading lequnement and defeat a motion to 
dismiss 
The Utah Govei nmental Immunity Act 
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"Governmental immunity is an affiimative defense 
to suits against state oi local government" Bucknei v 
Kennaid 2004 UT 78, f 35, 99 P 3d 842 But Utah, 
thiough the UGIA, has waived its immunity fiom 
ceitain types of claims See id Utah also lecogmzes a 
common law exception to the UGIA that allows 
plaintiffs to puisue equitable claims See El Rancho 
Elite? v, Inc v Mini ay City Coip , 565 P 2d 778, 779 
(Utah 1977) ("The common law exception to 
governmental immunity pei taming to equitable 
claims has long been lecogmzed m this 
junsdiction") Page concedes that UAMPS enjoys 
govei nmental immunity to the extent that immunity 
is not waived by the UGIA oi otheiwise abiogated by 
the equitable exception to the immunity doctnne 
The UGIA's Waiyei of Immunity Is Limited 
Page contends that its claims aie not baned because 
the UGIA waives immunity for claims that "arise" 
fiom contractual lights The heait of the paities' 
disagieement on this point is the piopei mterpietation 
of Utah Code section 63-30d-301(l)(a>(b), which 
states 
(l)(a) Immunity fiom suit of each governmental 
entity is waived as to any contiactual obligation 
(b) Actions ansmg out of conti actual lights or 
obligations are not subject to the lequnements of 
Sections 63-30d-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d, 403, or 
63-30d-601 [all of which 1 elate to notification and 
initiation pioceduies] 
Page aigues that the language of subsections (a) and 
(b) must be consideied togethei and that, theiefoie, 
the UGIA waives immunity for all conti actual 
obligations as well as any claim that "anses out" of a 
contiactual lelationship Accoidmg to Page, Causes 
3-4 (bieach of fiduciaiy duty and conflict of mteiest) 
anse out of contiact because they aie piennsed on 
UAMPS's alleged violation of expiess contiactual 
language that lequnes UAMPS to "act in the best 
mteiests of the UAMPS " (Plf's Opp'n to Def's Mot 
to Dismiss Counts Thiee Thiough Seven and Nine 7-
8, see id ("[T]he plain language of the Complaint 
casts Causes of Action Three and Four as ansmg 
dnectly fiom the contiactual obligations set foith in 
the Bylaws Page has suffeied a dnect haim as a 
result of UAMPS' failuie to comply with expiess 
conti actual pi oyisions lequiimg UAMPS to act m the 
'best mteiests of the UAMPS' and foibiddmg it fiom 
holding Page liable for the debts and liabilities of 
othei Membeis ") Moie specifically, Page claims that 
the UAMPS Boaid was "conti actually lequned to 
iefiam fiom engaging in conflict of mteiest 
tiansactions and voting," and "conti actually lequued 
to uphold then fiduciaiy duty to the oigamzation and 
© 2007 Thomson/West No Claim to Ong US Gov Woiks 
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its Members," and that the breach of express 
contractual provisions "entitled] Page to bring its 
conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty 
causes of action. {Id. at 11.) Additionally, Page 
argues that its unjust enrichment claim arises out of 
contract because UAMPS was unjustly enriched as a 
direct result of its breach of contract. 
*5 Page's argument boils down to an assertion that 
its claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of 
interest, and unjust enrichment "arisfe] directly" from 
a breach of express contract but are not breach of 
express contract claims in and of themselves. Case 
law does provide some support for Page's position 
that some claims can be considered as "arising" from 
contract. For example, the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that "a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is an 
independent tort that, on occasion, arises from a 
contractual duty." Norman v. Arnold. 2002 UT 8L % 
35, 57 P.3d 997. See Sadwickv. Univ. of Utah. 2001 
WL 741285 (D.Utah 2001) ("Although an action for 
breach of fiduciary duty may on rare occasions sound 
in contract, see Hal Taylor Associates v. 
Unionamerica. Inc.. 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982), 
under Utah law contracts rarely implicate a fiduciary 
relationship. See Semenov v. Hill. 982 P.2d 578, 580 
(Utah 1999)."). 
UAMPS counters that it makes no difference 
whether Page's causes of action "arise" from contact 
because, properly inteipreted, the UGIA's waiver of 
immunity is not broad enough to encompass such 
claims. According to UAMPS, the broad 
interpretation of the UGIA proposed by Page would 
eviscerate governmental immunity, rendering 
governmental entities exposed to any and all claims 
of a potential plaintiff whenever a contact is 
implicated in some fashion. The court agrees with 
UAMPS, at least so far as Causes 3-4 and Cause 7 
(breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of interest, and 
unjust enrichment) are concerned. 
When interpreting a statute, the court's "primary goal 
... is to give effect to the legislative intent, as 
evidenced by the plain language, in light of the 
puipose the statute was meant to achieve. Foutz v. 
City of'S Jordan. 2004 UT 74 % 11. 100 P.3d 1171 
(internal quotation omitted). And the plain language 
of Utah Code section 63-30d-301(l) does not support 
Page's assertion that the State of Utah has waived 
governmental immunity for claims "arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations." 
In interpreting the UGIA's waiver provision, Page 
puts the proverbial cart before the horse and asks the 
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court to read the statute backward, with subsection 
(b) defining the scope of the immunity waived by 
subsection (a). But the more appropriate 
interpretation is that subsection (a) waives immunity 
for contact claims and that subsection (b) waives 
notice requirements for any claim brought under 
subsection (a). It is evident from the plain language 
of the statute that subsection (a) directly identifies the 
scope of the waiver, while subsection (b) deals only 
with the issues of notice and suit initiation. In short, 
subsection (b) does not attempt to modify the scope 
of the waiver announced in subsection (a). Therefore, 
it would be incorrect to rely on subsection (b) as an 
aid to ascertain the scope of the waiver announced in 
subsection (a). [FN1] 
FN1. In contrast to Utah Code section 63-
30d-301(l)(b), the plain language of 
subsection (c) unquestionably modifies the 
scope of the waiver announced in subsection 
(a). Subsection (c) expressly retains 
immunity for the Division of Water 
Resources in certain situations where the 
Division is unable to meet contractual 
obligations to provide a set amount of water. 
The clear intent of subsection (c) is to 
modify the scope of the immunity waived by 
subsection (a). A similarly clear expression 
of legislative intent to modify the scope of 
waived immunity is noticeably lacking in 
subsection (b). 
Given the above, the court concludes that Utah Code 
section 63-30d-301(l) does not waive UAMPS's 
immunity from Causes 3-4 and Cause 7 of Page's 
Complaint (breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of 
interest, and unjust enrichment). Because Page has 
made no argument that its claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty and conflict of interest are allowable 
under another section of the UGIA or fall within the 
equitable exception to the UGIA, those two claims 
must be dismissed on governmental immunity 
grounds. 
Equitable Exception 
*6 Page argues that even if the UGIA does not 
contain an express waiver allowing Page to pursue 
Cause 7 (unjust enrichment), that claim falls within 
the equitable exception to the immunity doctrine and 
should therefore not be dismissed. Page also argues 
that its requests for declaratory relief under Arizona 
and Utah law (Causes 5-6) fall within the equitable 
exception and should not be dismissed. 
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The Utah Supieme Couit has frequently lecogmzed 
a common-law exception to the governmental 
immunity doctime that enables plaintiffs to puisue 
equitable claims m spite of governmental immunity 
See eg, Houzhton v Dept of Health, 2005 UT 63, f 
19 n 3, 125 P 3d 860, El Rancho Entei s Inc, 565 
P 2d at 780 The equitable exception to the immunity 
doctime suivived the passage of the UGIA See 
Houzhton. 2005 UT 63 at f 19 n 3 But the exact 
scope of the equitable exception lemams ill-defined 
Unjust Em ichment 
Even if Page's unjust enrichment claim falls within 
the equitable exception to the immunity doctime, it is 
neveitheless appiopnate to dismiss that cause of 
action fiom this suit because Page has an adequate 
lemedy at law See Buckner v Kennaid, 2004 UT 78, 
If 56, 99 P3d 842 ("[T]he geneial rule is that 
equitable junsdiction is piecluded if the plaintiff has 
an adequate lemedy at law and will not suffei 
substantial niepaiable mjuiy Equitable junsdiction is 
not justifiable simply because a paity's lemedy at law 
failed " (internal citations omitted)), see also William 
Q de Funiak, Handbook of Modem Equity 38 (2d ed 
1956) ("The want of equity junsdiction does not 
mean that the couit has no powei to act but that it 
should not act, as on the giound, foi example, that 
theie is an adequate lemedy at law") In Utah, the 
ability to puisue an unjust emichment claim 
piesupposes the absence of an enfoiceable expiess 
contact See Am Toweis Owneis Ass'n v CCI 
Mech . 930 P 2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996) ("If a legal 
lemedy is available, such as breach of an expiess 
contiact, the law will not imply the equitable lemedy 
of unjust emichment"), Davies v Olson, 746 P 2d 
264, 268 (Utah CtAppl987) ( "Recoveiy under 
quantum meiuit piesupposes that no enfoiceable 
wntten oi oial contiact exists ") 
Heie, the parties agiee that theie aie valid, expiess 
contracts that govern the relationship between 
UAMPS and Page A leview of Page's unjust 
emichment claim leveals that Page, thiough that 
claim, challenges the veiy actions at issue in its 
expiess contiact claims In shoit, Page has an 
adequate lemedy at law foi the allegations that seive 
as the foundation foi its unjust emichment claim and 
its unjust emichment claim is theiefoie dismissed 
Page's Request foi Declai atoi y Judgments 
Page's Complaint also contains a lequest foi 
declaiatoiy judgments undei both Arizona and Utah 
law Specifically, Page lequests declaiations that the 
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Cost Recoveiy Charge, as well as ceitam loans to 
UAMPS fiom Zions Fust National Bank aie ultia 
vnes and void undei eithei Anzona law, Utah law, oi 
both Page lepiesents that it "do[es] not seek money 
or damages" under Causes 5-6 (the declaratoiy 
judgment lequests), but only a declaration conceimng 
the legal authonty of UAMPS's and Page's authonty 
m Ielation to the Cost Recovery Chaige and the loans 
fiom Zions Bank (Plf's Opp'n to Def's Mot to 
Dismiss Counts Thiee Through Seven and Nine 15 ) 
*7 Accoidmgly, Page argues that its request foi 
declaiatoiy judgments falls withm the equitable 
exception to the immunity doctime The couit agiees 
Both El Rancho Enteipuses, 565 P 2d at 779-80, and 
Jenkins v Swan. 675 P 2d 1145, 1154 (Utah 1983), 
indicate that lequests for equitable relief aie not 
baned by governmental immunity and that the notice 
piovisions of the UGIA are inapplicable to equitable 
claims See Jenkins, 675 P 2d at 1154 ("Jenkins seeks 
equitable lehef m the foim of a declaiatoiy 
judgment [EJquitable claims of this natuie aie 
exempt fiom the notice lequirements") Indeed, 
Page's lequests for declaratory lehef appear strikingly 
similai to the types of claims m El Rancho 
Entei puses and Jenkins, namely, whether a 
governmental entity was acting within its lawful 
authonty See Jenkins, 675 P 2d at 1148 (action 
challenging peimissibihty of piopeity tax piactices), 
El Rancho Entei puses, 595 P 2d at 780 (oveichaiges 
by municipality "made by mistake oi fiaud and 
without authonty of law") 
Unlike Page's unjust emichment claim, the 
allegations contained in Page's lequest foi declaiatoiy 
judgments laise issues that extend beyond the 
boundanes of the express contracts that otheiwise 
govern UAMPS If the couit dismissed Page's lequest 
for declaiatoiy judgments, it would effectively 
deprive Page of any lehef wan anted by the 
allegations serving as the foundation foi that lequest 
Accoidmgly, UAMPS's motion to dismiss those 
claims is denied 
Open and Public Meetings Act 
Finally, it is piemature to dismiss Page's claim that 
UAMPS violated the Utah Open and Public Meetings 
Act UAMPS aigues that this cause of action should 
be dismissed because Page failed to file suit within 
ninety days of a meeting allegedly held in violation 
of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act See Utah 
Code Ann § 52-4-8 (lequnmg suits seeking to void 
final actions taken at meetings held m violation of the 
act to be commenced
 w lthm ninety days of the final 
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action). [FN2] 
FN2. The Utah Open and Public Meetings 
Act was renumbered and amended during 
the 2006 General Session of the Utah State 
Legislature. Because the prior version of the 
act was in effect at the time Page filed its 
Complaint and because the parties have 
relied on that version while briefing this 
issue, the court similarly cites to the 
previous version. No party has alleged that 
the revisions to the act in any way materially 
effect Page's claim. 
Page's Complaint does not identify any specific dates 
on which it alleges UAMPS held meetings in 
violation of the Open and Public Meetings Act. Also, 
Page does not confine its requested relief to voiding 
final actions taken by UAMPS. Rather, it seeks an 
order compelling UAMPS to comply with the act and 
making public any information evidencing what was 
discussed during meetings that were improperly 
closed. (See Compl. ^ 261.) 
Although Page's allegations do not provide specific 
dates of improper meetings, its Complaint does allege 
that UAMPS violated the act, and specifically claims 
that UAMPS held meetings without providing 
adequate notice and also illegally closed meetings. 
Applying liberal rules of notice pleading, Page's 
claim is sufficient to withstand a request for 
dismissal. See Corbin v. Runyon, No. 98-6288, 1999 
WL 590749 (10th Cir. Aim. 6, 1999) ("Even though 
Ms. Corbin's second amended complaint is certainly 
not a picture of clarity, it is sufficient under our 
liberal notice pleading rules to survive a motion to 
dismiss." (citing Porter v. Karavas, 157 F.2d 984, 
985-86 (10th Cir. 1946) ( "Indefiniteness of a 
complaint is not ground for dismissing the action if it 
states a claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to 
relief.")). Accordingly, Page has sufficiently stated a 
claim that UAMPS violated the Utah Open and 
Public Meetings Act, and UAMPS's motion to 
dismiss that claim is premature. 
Conclusion 
*8 The court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 
UAMPS's Motion to Dismiss Counts Three Through 
Seven and Nine. The court dismisses Page's third and 
fourth causes of action (Conflict of Interest and 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty) because the UGIA has not 
expressly waived immunity from those claims. The 
court declines to dismiss Page's fifth and sixth causes 
of action (both requests for declaratory relief) 
because those claims fall within the equitable 
Page 6 
exception to the immunity doctrine and seek relief on 
a broader scale than a simple recovery under contact. 
The court dismisses Page's seventh cause of action 
(unjust enrichment) because the UGIA has not 
waived immunity from that claim and Page possesses 
an adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged 
wrong. Finally, the court declines to dismiss Page's 
ninth cause of action pertaining to alleged violations 
of open meetings law. That claim sufficiently states a 
cause of action under the liberal rules of notice 
pleading to overcome UAMPS's request for 
dismissal. 
SO ORDERED this 7th day of July, 2006. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 1889882 
(D.Utah) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
TENA CAMPBELL, District Judge. 
*1 Plaintiff City of Page, Arizona ("Page"), filed this 
lawsuit against Defendant Utah Associated Municipal 
Power Systems ("UAMPS"), an interlocal 
cooperative agency of which Page is a Member. In its 
Complaint, Page alleges nine causes of action against 
UAMPS, most of which are in relation to UAMPS's 
imposition of a "Cost Recovery Charge" on its 
Members. UAMPS filed a motion to dismiss "counts" 
three through seven, as well as count nine. The three 
causes of action that UAMPS does not challenge 
through this motion are all breach of contract claims. 
UAMPS's primary contention in support of its 
motion is that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
("UGIA") bars nearly all of Page's claims. In relation 
to various causes of action, UAMPS also argues that 
(1) Page failed to follow procedural rules applicable 
to derivative suits, (2) Page failed to plead with 
enough particularity to overcome the presumption 
that the challenged actions of the UAMPS Board of 
Directors were properly left to the business judgment 
of the board, and (3) the relevant limitations period 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
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bars Page's challenge of the legality of certain 
UAMPS meetings. 
The court grants in part and denies in part UAMPS's 
motion. Specifically, Page's claims for "Conflict of 
Interest," "Breach of Fiduciary Duty," and "Unjust 
Enrichment/Constructive Trust" are dismissed. The 
court agrees with UAMPS that the UGIA has not 
expressly waived immunity for those claims. And 
although it may be the case that Page's claim for 
unjust enrichment falls within the equitable exception 
to the immunity doctrine, Page has an adequate 
remedy at law to address the allegations underlying 
that claim. As a result, it is not appropriate to 
exercise equitable jurisdiction over that claim. 
UAMPS's motion to dismiss Page's request for 
declaratory judgments is denied, because those 
causes of action fall within the equitable exception to 
the immunity doctrine. Additionally, Page has 
sufficiently stated a claim that UAMPS violated the 
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. Accordingly, 
UAMPS's motion to dismiss that claim is denied. 
Motion to Dismiss Standard 
A court should grant a motion to dismiss when the 
complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, fails to state a claim on which relief can be 
granted. See Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1039 
(10th Cir.2006) (all well-pleaded factual allegations 
of the complaint are accepted as true and viewed in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party), 
accord Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201 
(10th Cir.1998). While well-pleaded factual 
allegations are accepted as true, the court makes its 
own determination on legal issues. Hall v. Bellmon, 
935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). "[Dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6) 'is a harsh remedy which must be 
cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit of 
the liberal rules of pleading but also to protect the 
interests of justice.' " Moore, 438 F.3d at 1039 
(quoting Pur an v. Cam's, 238 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th 
Cir.2001) (quotation and citation omitted)). Granting 
dismissal is only appropriate when "it appears to a 
certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under 
any state of facts which could be proved in support of 
the claim." Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. Am. Petrofina, Inc., 
484 F.2d 1102, 1107 (10th Cir.1973) 
Factual Allegations 
*2 The following facts are taken from Page's 
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Complaint 
VAMPS 
UAMPS was formed undei the Utah Interlocal 
Cooperation Act (See Compl If 2 ) That act allows 
local governmental units "to coopeiate with othei 
localities on a basis of mutual advantage" in an effort 
to efficiently piovide seivices and facilities Utah 
Code Ann § 11-13-102 UAMPS consists of 
appioximately foity-five Members and is governed 
internally by its Amended and Restated Bylaws 
("Bylaws") and its Amended and Restated Agieement 
foi Joint and Coopeiative Action ("Joint Action 
Agieement") (See id at H ^ 8-9) The Bylaws 
lequne each Membei to appoint a Member 
Repiesentative to repiesent that Membei's mteiests 
when UAMPS exeicises its powers (Id at Tf 10) The 
Bylaws lequne the UAMPS Boaid of Duectois to act 
in the best mteiest of UAMPS (Id at^ f 11) 
Each Membei of UAMPS is lequned to sign a 
Power Pooling Agieement ("Pooling Agieement") 
and to subscube to a power pool (Id at ^ 17 ) But 
Membeis aie not lequned to consign surplus eneigy 
to the powei pool and, similarly, aie not lequned to 
puichase eneigy fiom the powei pool (Id) With the 
exception of Page's claim that UAMPS violated the 
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, the claims 
UAMPS seeks to dismiss thiough this motion involve 
the Pooling Agieement, (see Pool Agieement, 
attached to Compl as Ex C) 
The UAMPS Powei Pool and Cost Recoveiy Chaige 
Citing volatility in the eneigy maiket, the UAMPS 
Powei Pool Committee dnected UAMPS staff to 
acqune "foiwaid-puichase contiacts," which aie 
essentially eneigy pui chase agieements set at a 
locked rate (See Compl ^ 37) The pui chaser of 
such a contract is betting that the locked-in pui chase 
late will be lowei than the maiket late at the time the 
pui chases aie consummated (See id) 
Although UAMPS leceived assuiances fiom seveial 
Membeis that they would subscube to the foiwaid-
pui chased powei, UAMPS enteied into seveial 
pui chase contiacts without seeming fiim 
commitments that Membei s would subscube to the 
powei pui chased (Id at ^ 42) UAMPS Membei s 
instead waited on the sidelines watching maiket lates 
to determine if subscribing to the powei acquned by 
UAMPS would be economically beneficial (See id 
at TI 54) Pievailmg maiket conditions lendeied the 
powei seemed by the foiwaid-pui chase contiacts 
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economically unatti active and not one Membei of 
UAMPS subsenbed to the power UAMPS acquned 
thiough those contiacts (See id at ^ 65, 68 ) 
As a lesult, UAMPS was saddled with uneconomical 
foiwaid-pm chase contracts and began to take steps to 
cover the loss (See id at 1f | 74-75) As pait of 
UAMPS's effoit to offset the losses it had suffeied, 
the UAMPS Board imposed a "Cost Recoveiy 
Chaige" on all UAMPS Membeis 
In its Complaint, Page laises seveial allegations of 
wrongdoing on the part of UAMPS m connection 
with the piocuiement of the foiwaid-pui chase 
contiacts and the steps taken by UAMPS to cover the 
losses resulting fiom those contiacts Page's essential 
claim is that UAMPS impeimissibly allowed active 
paiticipants m the Powei Pool to speculate on the 
eneigy market and to use UAMPS Membeis as a 
safety net to cover any losses that could lesult fiom 
that speculation Accoidmg to Page, any piofit gained 
as a lesult of the energy-market speculation would 
benefit only Power Pool paiticipants, but any loss 
would unfairly be allocated to all UAMPS Membeis, 
whethei they actively paiticipated m the Powei Pool 
or not In shoit, Page claims that UAMPS failed to 
place the mteiests of UAMPS, as an entity, above the 
individual mteiests of some UAMPS Membeis 
Open Meetings 
*3 In its Complaint, Page also alleges that UAMPS 
violated the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act 
Page does not identify any paiticular meeting that 
was held in violation of the act, but claims that 
UAMPS held executive meetings without piovidmg 
proper notice and without following any appioved 
pioceduie to close meetings to the public Page 
additionally alleges that UAMPS took actions against 
Page's mteiest at meetings held m violation of the act 
Analysis 
Thiough this motion, UAMPS is seeking to dismiss 
six of Page's causes of action Cause Three (Conflict 
of Intel est), Cause Foui (Bleach of Fiduciaiy Duty), 
Cause Five (Declaiatoiy Judgment Under Anzona 
Law), Cause Six (Declaiatoiy Judgment Undei Utah 
Law), Cause Seven (Unjust Enrichment), and Cause 
Nine (Violation of Open Meetings Law) UAMPS 
aigues that Causes 3-4 (Conflict of Inteiest and 
Bieach of Fiduciaiy Duty) should be dismissed 
because (1) the UGIA has not expiessly waived 
immunity fiom the claims, (2) Page failed to follow 
piocedmal lules applicable to denvative actions, and 
(3) Page failed to plead with enough paiticulanty to 
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oveicome the piesumption that the challenged actions 
of the UAMPS Boaid weie piopeily left to the 
boaid's business judgment UAMPS aigues that 
Causes 5-7 (the lequests for declaiatory lehef and 
claim for unjust emichment) aie also baned by the 
UGIA Finally, UAMPS contends that Cause 9 
(violation of open meetings law) is baned by the 
limitations period set foith m the Utah Open and 
Public Meetings Act 
The couit concludes that the UGIA does not 
expressly waive governmental immunity fiom Page's 
claims foi conflict of mteiest, bieach of fiduciary 
duty, and unjust enrichment Nevertheless, Page 
aigues that even if the UGIA does not expiessly 
waive immunity fiom Page's unjust emichment 
claim, that claim should not be dismissed because it 
falls within the equitable exception to the immunity 
doctime But Page's contiact claims piovide it with 
an adequate lemedy at law to addiess the factual 
allegations undeilying its unjust emichment claim 
Accordingly, the court declines to exeicise equity 
junsdiction ovei that claim 
Because the court finds that theie has been no waiver 
of immunity fiom Page's claims for bieach of 
fiducialy duty and conflict of mteiest, theie is no 
need to addiess UAMPS's aigument that those causes 
of action should be dismissed for failuie to comply 
with pioceduial lequiiements applicable to denvative 
suits Similaily, the court's conclusion lendeis moot 
UAMPS's aigument that those causes should be 
dismissed foi Page's alleged failuie to oveicome the 
piesumption that the challenged actions of the 
UAMPS Boaid weie piopeily left to the boaid's 
business judgment 
The court denies UAMPS's motion to dismiss Page's 
lequest foi declaiatoiy lehef undei both Anzona and 
Utah law Page's declaiatoiy judgment claims fall 
within the equitable exception to the immunity 
doctime and, because Page does not have an adequate 
remedy at law to addiess the allegations undei lying 
its lequest for declaiatoiy judgments, those claims 
may pioceed 
*4 Finally, the court denies UAMPS's lequest to 
dismiss Page's claim that UAMPS violated Utah open 
meetings laws In outlining this cause of action, 
Page's Complaint is sufficient to satisfy the hbeial 
notice pleading lequnement and defeat a motion to 
dismiss 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
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"Governmental immunity is an affiimative defense 
to suits against state oi local government" Bucknei v 
Keimaid. 2004 UT 78, f 35, 99 P 3d 842 But Utah, 
thiough the UGIA, has waived its immunity fiom 
certain types of claims See id Utah also lecogmzes a 
common law exception to the UGIA that allows 
plaintiffs to pursue equitable claims See El Rancho 
Entei v, fnc v Munay City Coip , 565 P 2d 778, 779 
(Utah 1977) ("The common law exception to 
governmental immunity pertaining to equitable 
claims has long been lecogmzed m this 
jurisdiction") Page concedes that UAMPS enjoys 
governmental immunity to the extent that immunity 
is not waived by the UGIA oi otheiwise abiogated by 
the equitable exception to the immunity doctime 
The UGIA's Waivei of Immunity Is Limited 
Page contends that its claims aie not baned because 
the UGIA waives immunity for claims that "arise" 
fiom contiactual lights The heart of the parties' 
disagieement on this point is the piopei mterpietation 
of Utah Code section 63-30d-301(l)(a)-(b), which 
states 
(l)(a) Immunity fiom suit of each governmental 
entity is waived as to any conti actual obligation 
(b) Actions ansmg out of conti actual lights or 
obligations are not subject to the lequiiements of 
Sections 63-30(1-401, 63-30d-402, 63-30d, 403, or 
63-30d-601 [all of which lelate to notification and 
initiation piocedmes] 
Page aigues that the language of subsections (a) and 
(b) must be consideied togethei and that, theiefoie, 
the UGIA waives immunity for all conti actual 
obligations as well as any claim that "anses out" of a 
conti actual lelationship Accoidmg to Page, Causes 
3-4 (bieach of fiduciaiy duty and conflict of mteiest) 
anse out of contiact because they aie piemised on 
UAMPS's alleged violation of expiess contiactual 
language that lequnes UAMPS to "act in the best 
mteiests of the UAMPS " (Plfs Opp'n to Def's Mot 
to Dismiss Counts Thiee Thiough Seven and Nine 7-
8, see id ("[T]he plain language of the Complaint 
casts Causes of Action Thiee and Foui as ansing 
dnectly fiom the contiactual obligations set forth in 
the Bylaws Page has suffeied a duect haim as a 
result of UAMPS' failuie to comply with expiess 
conti actual pi ovisions lequnmg UAMPS to act in the 
'best mteiests of the UAMPS' and foibiddmg it fiom 
holding Page liable foi the debts and liabilities of 
other Membeis ") Moie specifically, Page claims that 
the UAMPS Boaid was "conti actually lequued to 
lefiam fiom engaging in conflict of interest 
tiansactions and voting," and "contiactually lequued 
to uphold then fiduciary duty to the oigamzation and 
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its Members," and that the breach of express 
contractual provisions "entitlfed] Page to bring its 
conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty 
causes of action. (Id. at 11.) Additionally, Page 
argues that its unjust enrichment claim arises out of 
contact because UAMPS was unjustly enriched as a 
direct result of its breach of contract. 
*5 Page's argument boils down to an assertion that 
its claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of 
interest, and unjust enrichment "arisfe] directly" from 
a breach of express contract but are not breach of 
express contract claims in and of themselves. Case 
law does provide some support for Page's position 
that some claims can be considered as "arising" from 
contract. For example, the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that "a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is an 
independent tort that, on occasion, arises from a 
contractual duty." Norman v. Arnold. 2002 UT 81, f 
35, 57 P.3d 997. See Sadwick v. Univ. of Utah. 2001 
WL 741285 (D.Utah 2001) ("Although an action for 
breach of fiduciary duty may on rare occasions sound 
in contract, see Hal Taylor Associates v. 
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982), 
under Utah law contracts rarely implicate a fiduciary 
relationship. See Semenov v. Hill, 982 P.2d 578, 580 
(Utah 1999)."). 
UAMPS counters that it makes no difference 
whether Page's causes of action "arise" from contract 
because, properly interpreted, the UGIA's waiver of 
immunity is not broad enough to encompass such 
claims. According to UAMPS, the broad 
interpretation of the UGIA proposed by Page would 
eviscerate governmental immunity, rendering 
governmental entities exposed to any and all claims 
of a potential plaintiff whenever a contract is 
implicated in some fashion. The court agrees with 
UAMPS, at least so far as Causes 3-4 and Cause 7 
(breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of interest, and 
unjust enrichment) are concerned. 
When interpreting a statute, the court's "primary goal 
... is to give effect to the legislative intent, as 
evidenced by the plain language, in light of the 
puipose the statute was meant to achieve. Foutz v. 
City ofS. Jordan, 2004 UT 74 <|f 11, 100 P.3d 1171 
(internal quotation omitted). And the plain language 
of Utah Code section 63-30d-301(l) does not support 
Page's assertion that the State of Utah has waived 
governmental immunity for claims "arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations." 
In interpreting the UGIA's waiver provision, Page 
puts the proverbial cart before the horse and asks the 
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court to read the statute backward, with subsection 
(b) defining the scope of the immunity waived by 
subsection (a). But the more appropriate 
interpretation is that subsection (a) waives immunity 
for contract claims and that subsection (b) waives 
notice requirements for any claim brought under 
subsection (a). It is evident from the plain language 
of the statute that subsection (a) directly identifies the 
scope of the waiver, while subsection (b) deals only 
with the issues of notice and suit initiation. In short, 
subsection (b) does not attempt to modify the scope 
of the waiver announced in subsection (a). Therefore, 
it would be incorrect to rely on subsection (b) as an 
aid to ascertain the scope of the waiver announced in 
subsection (a). [FN1] 
FN1. In contrast to Utah Code section 63-
30d-301(l)(b), the plain language of 
subsection (c) unquestionably modifies the 
scope of the waiver announced in subsection 
(a). Subsection (c) expressly retains 
immunity for the Division of Water 
Resources in certain situations where the 
Division is unable to meet contractual 
obligations to provide a set amount of water. 
The clear intent of subsection (c) is to 
modify the scope of the immunity waived by 
subsection (a). A similarly clear expression 
of legislative intent to modify the scope of 
waived immunity is noticeably lacking in 
subsection (b). 
Given the above, the court concludes that Utah Code 
section 63-30d-301(l) does not waive UAMPS's 
immunity from Causes 3-4 and Cause 7 of Page's 
Complaint (breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of 
interest, and unjust enrichment). Because Page has 
made no argument that its claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty and conflict of interest are allowable 
under another section of the UGIA or fall within the 
equitable exception to the UGIA, those two claims 
must be dismissed on governmental immunity 
grounds. 
Equitable Exception 
*6 Page argues that even if the UGIA does not 
contain an express waiver allowing Page to pursue 
Cause 7 (unjust enrichment), that claim falls within 
the equitable exception to the immunity doctrine and 
should therefore not be dismissed. Page also argues 
that its requests for declaratory relief under Arizona 
and Utah law (Causes 5-6) fall within the equitable 
exception and should not be dismissed. 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Not Repoited in F Supp 2d 
Not Repoited in F Supp 2d, 2006 WL 1889882 (D Utah) 
(Cite as: 2006 WL 1889882 (D.Utah)) 
The Utah Supieme Couit has frequently lecognized 
a common-law exception to the governmental 
immunity doctime that enables plaintiffs to puisue 
equitable claims m spite of governmental immunity 
See, eg Houghton v Dept of Health, 2005 UT 63, <[f 
19 n 3, 125 P 3d 860, El Rancho Entei s , Jnc, 565 
P 2d at 780 The equitable exception to the immunity 
doctime suivived the passage of the UGIA See 
Houghton. 2005 UT 63 at ^ 19 n 3 But the exact 
scope of the equitable exception xemains ill-defined 
Unjust Em ichment 
Even if Page's unjust em ichment claim falls within 
the equitable exception to the immunity doctime, it is 
neveitheless appiopiiate to dismiss that cause of 
action fiom this suit because Page has an adequate 
lemedy at law See Bucknei v Kennaid, 2004 UT 78, 
If 56, 99 P3d 842 (M[T]he geneial rule is that 
equitable jurisdiction is piecluded if the plaintiff has 
an adequate lemedy at law and will not suffei 
substantial mepaiable mjmy Equitable junsdiction is 
not justifiable simply because a paity's lemedy at law 
failed " (internal citations omitted)), see also William 
Q de Funiak, Handbook of Modem Equity 38 (2d ed 
1956) ("The want of equity junsdiction does not 
mean that the couit has no powei to act but that it 
should not act, as on the giound, foi example, that 
there is an adequate remedy at law") In Utah, the 
ability to puisue an unjust em ichment claim 
piesupposes the absence of an enfoiceable expiess 
contiact See Am Toweis Owneis Ass'n \ CCI 
Mech . 930 P 2d 1182. 1193 (Utah 1996) ("If a legal 
lemedy is available, such as bieach of an expiess 
contiact, the law will not imply the equitable lemedy 
of unjust em ichment "), Davies v Olson, 746 P 2d 
264, 268 (Utah CtApp 1987) ( "Recoveiy under 
quantum meiuit piesupposes that no enfoiceable 
wntten or oial contiact exists ") 
Heie, the paities agiee that theie aie valid, expiess 
contacts that govern the lelationship between 
UAMPS and Page A leview of Page's unjust 
em ichment claim leveals that Page, thiough that 
claim, challenges the veiy actions at issue in its 
expiess contiact claims In shoit, Page has an 
adequate lemedy at law foi the allegations that seive 
as the foundation foi its unjust em ichment claim and 
its unjust em ichment claim is theiefoie dismissed 
Page's Request foi Declai atoiy Judgments 
Page's Complaint also contains a lequest for 
declaiatoiy judgments undei both Arizona and Utah 
law Specifically, Page lequests declaiations that the 
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Cost Recoveiy Charge, as well as certain loans to 
UAMPS fiom Zions First National Bank aie ultia 
vnes and void undei eithei Anzona law, Utah law, or 
both Page represents that it "do[es] not seek money 
or damages" under Causes 5-6 (the declaratoiy 
judgment lequests), but only a declaiation concerning 
the legal authonty of UAMPS's and Page's authonty 
m Ielation to the Cost Recoveiy Charge and the loans 
fiom Zions Bank (Plf's Opp'n to Def's Mot to 
Dismiss Counts Thiee Through Seven and Nine 15 ) 
*7 Accoidmgly, Page aigues that its lequest for 
declaratory judgments falls withm the equitable 
exception to the immunity doctime The couit agiees 
Both El Rancho Enteipuses, 565 P 2d at 779-80, and 
Jenkins v Swan. 675 P 2d 1145, 1154 (Utah 1983), 
indicate that lequests foi equitable lehef aie not 
baned by governmental immunity and that the notice 
piovisions of the UGIA aie inapplicable to equitable 
claims See Jenkins, 675 P 2d at 1154 ("Jenkins seeks 
equitable lehef m the foim of a declaratoiy 
judgment [EJquitable claims of this natuie aie 
exempt fiom the notice lequirements") Indeed, 
Page's lequests for declaiatory lehef appear strikingly 
similai to the types of claims m El Rancho 
Enteipuses and Jenkins, namely, whether a 
governmental entity was acting within its lawful 
authonty See Jenkins, 675 P 2d at 1148 (action 
challenging peimissibihty of piopeity tax piactices), 
El Rancho Entei puses, 595 P 2d at 780 (overchaiges 
by municipality "made by mistake or fiaud and 
without authonty of law") 
Unlike Page's unjust em ichment claim, the 
allegations contained m Page's lequest foi declaiatoiy 
judgments laise issues that extend beyond the 
boundanes of the expiess contiacts that otheiwise 
govern UAMPS If the couit dismissed Page's lequest 
for declaiatoiy judgments, it would effectively 
depnve Page of any lehef wan anted by the 
allegations seivmg as the foundation foi that lequest 
Accoidmgly, UAMPS's motion to dismiss those 
claims is denied 
Open and Public Meetings Act 
Finally, it is piematuie to dismiss Page's claim that 
UAMPS violated the Utah Open and Public Meetings 
Act UAMPS argues that this cause of action should 
be dismissed because Page failed to file suit within 
ninety days of a meeting allegedly held m violation 
of the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act See Utah 
Code Ann § 52-4-8 (lequnmg suits seeking to void 
final actions taken at meetings held m violation of the 
act to be commenced within ninety days of the final 
© 2007 Thomson/West No Claim to Orig US Gov Woiks 
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action). [FN2] 
FN2. The Utah Open and Public Meetings 
Act was renumbered and amended during 
the 2006 General Session of the Utah State 
Legislature. Because the prior version of the 
act was in effect at the time Page filed its 
Complaint and because the parties have 
relied on that version while briefing this 
issue, the court similarly cites to the 
previous version. No party has alleged that 
the revisions to the act in any way materially 
effect Page's claim. 
Page's Complaint does not identify any specific dates 
on which it alleges UAMPS held meetings in 
violation of the Open and Public Meetings Act. Also, 
Page does not confine its requested relief to voiding 
final actions taken by UAMPS. Rather, it seeks an 
order compelling UAMPS to comply with the act and 
making public any information evidencing what was 
discussed during meetings that were improperly 
closed. {See Compl. f 261.) 
Although Page's allegations do not provide specific 
dates of improper meetings, its Complaint does allege 
that UAMPS violated the act, and specifically claims 
that UAMPS held meetings without providing 
adequate notice and also illegally closed meetings. 
Applying liberal rules of notice pleading, Page's 
claim is sufficient to withstand a request for 
dismissal. See Corbin v. Runyon. No. 98-6288, 1999 
WL 590749 (10th Cir. Aug. 6, 1999) ("Even though 
Ms. Corbin's second amended complaint is certainly 
not a picture of clarity, it is sufficient under our 
liberal notice pleading rules to survive a motion to 
dismiss." (citing Porter v. Karavas, 157 F.2d 984, 
985-86 (10th Cir. 1946) ( "Indefmiteness of a 
complaint is not ground for dismissing the action if it 
states a claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to 
relief")). Accordingly, Page has sufficiently stated a 
claim that UAMPS violated the Utah Open and 
Public Meetings Act, and UAMPS's motion to 
dismiss that claim is premature. 
Conclusion 
*8 The court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 
UAMPS's Motion to Dismiss Counts Three Through 
Seven and Nine. The court dismisses Page's third and 
fourth causes of action (Conflict of Interest and 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty) because the UGIA has not 
expressly waived immunity from those claims. The 
court declines to dismiss Page's fifth and sixth causes 
of action (both requests for declaratory relief) 
because those claims fall within the equitable 
Page 6 
exception to the immunity doctrine and seek relief on 
a broader scale than a simple recovery under contract. 
The court dismisses Page's seventh cause of action 
(unjust enrichment) because the UGIA has not 
waived immunity from that claim and Page possesses 
an adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged 
wrong. Finally, the court declines to dismiss Page's 
ninth cause of action pertaining to alleged violations 
of open meetings law. That claim sufficiently states a 
cause of action under the liberal rules of notice 
pleading to overcome UAMPS's request for 
dismissal. 
SO ORDERED this 7th day of July, 2006. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 1889882 
(D.Utah) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Before Judges BENCH, McHUGH, and THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
THORNE, Judge: 
*1 Defendant A. Paul Schwenke appeals from his 
jury trial convictions of securities fraud, seeUtah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2006), attempted theft by 
deception, seeUtah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (2003), 
communications fraud, see id. § 76-10-1801 
(Supp.2007), and pattern of unlawful activity, see id. 
§ 76-10-1603 (2003). Because Defendant's brief is 
inadequate under rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, we decline to review his claims. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
"It is well established that Utah appellate courts will 
not consider claims that are inadequately 
bxkfed"State v. Gamer. 2002 UT App 234, ]\ 8, 52 
P.3d 467. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) 
states that the appellant's brief "shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect 
to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of 
the record relied on.'TJtah R.App. P. 24(a)(9). 
Although appellate courts are generally lenient with 
pro se litigants, see Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, \ 
4, 67 P.3d 1000, such parties must still comply with 
the rules. Even taking into account Defendant's 
circumstances in preparing his brief while 
incarcerated, considering references to well settled 
principles of law without citation, and giving him the 
leniency generally afforded pro se litigants,^ 
Defendant's brief is nonetheless inadequate for failure 
to substantially comply with rule 24. 
FN1. We do note that Defendant is not in the 
same position as most pro se litigants in that, 
as a disbaned attorney, he is law trained. 
We initially note that Defendant failed to demonstrate 
grounds for reviewing issues not preserved in the trial 
court. Defendant argues for the first time on appeal 
that (1) his convictions violate his constitutional right 
against double jeopardy; (2) the trial court erred in its 
jury instructions on the elements of attempted theft 
by deception and communications fraud; and (3) the 
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support 
his convictions of securities fraud, communications 
fraud, and pattern of unlawful activity. " 'Under 
ordinary circumstances, we will not consider an issue 
brought for the first time on appeal unless the trial 
court committed plain error or exceptional 
circumstances exist.' " State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f 
45, 114 P.3d 551 (quoting State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 
2004 UT 29, % 16, 94 P.3d 186). Defendant did not, 
in his opening brief, argue that plain error or 
exceptional circumstances existed to justify a review 
of these issues.—Defendant did assert, in his reply 
brief, that the issues raised on appeal were questions 
of law and plain error. However, "we will not 
consider matters raised for the first time in the reply 
brief." Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, f 9, 17 P.3d 
1122. Because Defendant failed to argue that plain 
error or exceptional circumstances exist to justify a 
review of those issues, we decline to consider them 
on appeal. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 
n. 5 (Utah 1995). 
FN2. Defendant, in his statement of the 
issues presented in his opening brief, 
identified the standard of review for the first 
two issues as plain error, but did not argue 
plain error in his opening brief. 
*2 Even if Defendant's issues were properly 
preserved, we would nonetheless decline to review 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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his issues because Defendant's brief is, in large part, 
devoid of any meaningful legal analysis. 
"[T]o permit meaningful appellate review, briefs 
must comply with the briefing requirements 
sufficiently to enable us to understand ... what 
particular errors were allegedly made, where in the 
record those errors can be found, and why, under 
applicable authorities, those errors are material ones 
necessitating reversal or other relief." 
Garner. 2002 UT App 234. f 13 (alteration and 
omission in original) (quoting State v. Lucero, 2002 
UT App 135, 1[ 13, 47 P.3d 107VThis analysis 
'requires not just bald citation to authority but 
development of that authority and reasoned analysis 
based on that authority.' " Id. \ 12 (quoting State v. 
Thomas. 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998)). 
Defendant's arguments on appeal consist, in large 
part, of conclusory statements without relevant legal 
citations and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority. Defendant's argument that the trial court 
erred in its jury instructions on attempted theft by 
deception and communications fraud provides an 
illustration of his inadequate briefing. Defendant 
asserts that the jury instructions reduced the State's 
burden of proof because the instructions improperly 
state the elements of attempted theft by deception and 
communications fraud. However, the jury 
instructions track the statutory language, and 
Defendant fails to address or otherwise identify the 
manner in which either of the jury instructions 
conflict with the statutory language to reduce the 
State's burden. SeeUtah Code Ann. § § 76-6-405, 76= 
10-1801. Because the relevant jury instructions track 
the statutory language and Defendant demonstrates 
no conflict, we conclude that Defendant has failed to 
brief a challenge to the jury instruction issue 
sufficient to permit review. 
Similarly, Defendant also failed to adequately brief 
his argument that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his jury trial convictions of securities fraud, 
communications fraud, and pattern of unlawful 
activity. In arguing that the State failed to prove 
various elements, Defendant provides few relevant 
citations to legal authority and no legal basis for his 
contention that the evidence presented was 
insufficient to support his convictions. For example, 
Defendant provides one citation pertaining to his 
securities fraud argument that the stock at issue was 
not a security. However, the case cited, Securities & 
Exchange Commission v. W.J. Howev Co., 328 U.S. 
293 (1946), which addresses federal securities fraud 
law, does not provide support for Defendant's 
argument that the stock at issue was only a "paper 
transfer" and therefore was not a security. Neither 
does Defendant provide any supporting legal analysis 
for this contention. Likewise, other citations 
pertaining to communications fraud and partem of 
unlawful activity are similarly afflicted. Because 
Defendant fails to provide meaningful analysis or 
supporting legal citation for his insufficiency of the 
evidence arguments, we decline to review them. 
*3 Defendant also failed to adequately brief his 
argument that defense counsel was ineffective. To 
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Defendant must show that his counsel "rendered 
deficient performance which fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and ... 
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced 
\\imrState v. Hernandez. 2005 UT App 546, f 17, 
128 P.3d 556 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Although Defendant references the two-part test 
previously stated, he fails to challenge the strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and made all significant decisions in the 
exercise of reasonable professional judgment. See 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 
Defendant also makes no attempt to demonstrate how 
defense counsel's actions or inactions fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness or prejudiced 
Defendant in any manner. Instead, Defendant merely 
lists defense counsel's alleged failings and concludes 
that the various failings constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel. However, "[a] brief must go 
beyond providing conclusory statements and 'fully 
identify, analyze, and cite its legal arguments.' " West 
Jordan City v. Goodman. 2006 UT 27, ^ 29, 135 
P.3d 874 (quoting State v. Green. 2005 UT 9, f 11, 
108 P.3d 710). Because Defendant's ineffective 
assistance of counsel argument provides no relevant 
legal citation or meaningful analysis, we decline to 
review this issue based on inadequate briefing. 
Likewise, Defendant fails to adequately analyze the 
issues pertaining to his argument that the trial court 
erred in permitting the State to amend the charge of 
theft to attempted theft by deception. An indictment 
or information may be amended with the trial court's 
permission at any time before verdict if no additional 
or different offense is charged and the substantial 
rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. ffgeUtah 
R.Crim. P. 4(d). Defendant asserts that, because the 
attempted theft by deception charge involves 
different elements of proof than the original charge 
— of theft, the theft by deception charge is a new 
and separate offense for which he was not properly 
charged. Therefore he contends that he was convicted 
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FN3. Theft by deception requires a 
misrepresentation, which is not necessary 
for a theft conviction. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 
§ 76-6-404 (2003), 76-6-405. 
Although the two theft charges at issue involve 
different elements, this does not in and of itself 
demonstrate that attempted theft by deception is a 
new and separate offense. Utah's consolidated theft 
statute provides that a theft by deception charge is a 
theory of theft and not a separate offense. ffgeUtah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-403 (2003). Neither does the 
information's amendment to charge a different theory 
of theft necessarily offend the procedural safeguards 
in the criminal process. Under Utah's consolidated 
theft statute, allowing an information's amendment to 
charge a different theory of theft, even though the 
theory being advanced involves different elements of 
proof, "does not offend the procedural safeguards in 
the criminal process, so long as defendant is 
adequately notified of the theory being used and 
given ample time to prepare a defense to the 
charge."Stafe v. Busk 2001 UT App 10, f 16, 47 
P.3d 69. Defendant does not claim that he was 
inadequately notified of the alternate theory of theft 
by deception or that he had inadequate time to 
prepare a defense. Rather, he simply argues, without 
addressing the contrary holding in Bush, that theft by 
deception is a new charge that violates his due 
process rights. Because Defendant does not challenge 
the Bush holding or claim that he was not afforded 
sufficient time to prepare a defense to the amended 
charge of theft by deception, his brief is inadequate to 
allow review. We therefore decline to address this 
issue. 
*4 Finally, we address Defendant's motion to strike 
an addendum in the State's brief, which contained a 
typed copy of Defendant's handwritten brief. The 
State did not purport to provide the typed copy as a 
substitute for Defendant's brief, rather the State 
provided it as a courtesy, which is appreciated. 
Although Defendant directs our attention to some 
minor differences between the typed and handwritten 
versions, he does not point to any errors that affect 
the meaning of his brief Because Defendant does not 
identify any substantial errors that would affect the 
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WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Presiding 
Judge and CAROLYN B. McHUGH, Judge. 
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